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GENERAL STREAM ADJUDICATIONS
AS A PROPERTY AND REGULATORY MODEL
FOR ADDRESSING THE DEPLETION
OF THE OGALLALA AQUIFER
Burke W. Griggs*
I. Introduction
It is a truth long acknowledged, that a river basin possessed by too many
claims, must be in want of an adjudication.1 The reason is simple: because “you
can’t administer something you can’t define.”2 Over the past five decades, western
states have embarked upon numerous general stream adjudications to define and
decree every water right on the subject stream, so that state engineers and state
courts can protect and administer these rights in times of shortage.3 But these
* Non-Resident Fellow, Woods Institute for the Environment, and Affiliated Scholar, Bill
Lane Center for the American West, both at Stanford University; Assistant Attorney General, State
of Kansas. I thank Professor Jason A. Robison of the University of Wyoming College of Law, for his
thorough critique of an earlier draft of this article, which improved the final version considerably. I
also thank Ramsey Kropf, Esq., John Thorson, Esq., and the staff of the Wyoming Law Review for
supporting my contributions to the Big Horn Symposium and to this issue. All opinions, errors, and
intemperance are mine alone.
1
Elwood Mead, Irrigation Institutions: A Discussion of the Economic and Legal
Questions Created by the Growth of Irrigated Agriculture in the West 371 (1903) (with
apologies to Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice 1 (1966 ed.) (1813)).
2
Clive Strong, Esq., as quoted in Scott Graf, Why It Took 27 years and $94 Million to
Complete Idaho Water Rights Adjudication, Boise State Public Radio (Aug. 29, 2014), http://
boisestatepublicradio.org/post/why-it-took-27-years-and-94-million-complete-idaho-water-rightsadjudication. Mr. Strong represented the State of Idaho in the Snake River Basin Adjudication,
which adjudicated 158,591 decreed rights in twenty-seven years—a rate of one claim every ninety
minutes, as United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia pointed out in his remarks on the
occasion of the signing of the final decree. Clive Strong, SRBA Retrospective: A 27-Year Effort, 57
Advocate (Idaho) 28 (Nov./Dec., 2014).

For a comprehensive history and analysis of modern general stream adjudications, see
generally John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and
3
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voyages have not been easy. The Gila River adjudication has produced the largest
and longest judicial proceeding in the history of Arizona, and among the most
complex in American history.4 Yet as of this writing, it is “a long way from the
decree stage.”5 Two of the most ambitious adjudications, the Big Horn Adjudica
tion in Wyoming (initiated in 1977) and the Snake River Basin Adjudication
in Idaho (initiated in 1987), concluded in 2014—and these are the fast ones.6
Together, these two adjudications have resolved nearly half a million dispersed
state and federal claims into approximately 150,000 decreed water rights.7 The
Snake River decree runs 275,000 pages and quantifies every right in Idaho’s
portion of the basin. As a result, the State of Idaho can now proudly claim
(through its top water lawyer) that the “foundation for ‘effective management’
of its water resources has been laid.”8 Because, after all, you can’t administer—or
manage—what you can’t define.
The Snake River Basin and Big Horn adjudications are significant
accomplishments. They have required costly, time-consuming, and contentious
proceedings. Their very existence and endurance reflect their respective states’
political will to achieve durability and clarity in one of the most complex areas of
property law. Or so the states hope. But have these adjudications achieved their
goals so as to justify the expense of treasure, time, and political capital? Answering
that question can be difficult. Supporters of general stream adjudications usually
rely upon faith-based arguments that assume their lasting value; they believe
that prior appropriation rights can be made “perfectively certain” through the
adjudication process.9 Those who pursue a cost-benefit analysis of an adjudica

Streams, 8 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 355 (Spring 2005) [hereinafter Thorson et al., 2005]; John E.
Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, Part II, 9 U
Denv. Water L. Rev. 299 (Spring, 2006) [hereinafter Thorson et al., 2006]. My debt to these two
articles is obvious throughout this article.
4
Joseph M. Feller, The Adjudication That Ate Arizona Water Law, 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 405,
406 (2007).
5
John Weldon, Esq., Presentation at Big Horn Adjudication Symposium, Riverton,
Wyoming (Sept. 11, 2014) (notes on file with author). Mr. Weldon represents the Salt River Project.

For a useful history of the Big Horn Adjudication, see Jason A. Robison, Wyoming’s Big
Horn General Stream Adjudication, 15 Wyo. L. Rev. 243 (2015). The Big Horn Adjudication
effectively concluded with the issuance of a Final Order by Judge Robert E. Sklar of Wyoming’s
Fifth Judicial District Court on September 5, 2014. In re the General Adjudication of All Rights
to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, Final Order
(Sept. 5, 2014), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/9-29-14a.
PDF. Since then, two appeals have been filed with the Wyoming Supreme Court, both of which
concern relatively minor matters involving state law-based appropriative water rights addressed in
Phase III of the adjudication.
6

7

Strong, supra note 2, at 28–29.

8

Id. at 29.

Dan Tarlock, General Stream Adjudications: A Good Public Investment? 133 J. Contemp.
Water Res. & Educ. 52, 53 (May 2006).
9
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tion soon meet with disappointment, because the costs arrive immediately
while the benefits arrive in the future, so any calculation will overstate costs and
understate benefits.10 Detractors of general stream adjudications can easily point
to their costs, delays, and disappointments. Beyond the frightful transaction
costs, the detractors can always turn to functionalist arguments in general, and
to law and economics arguments in particular. These arguments usually rest
upon the belief that the law serves mostly to reflect and to reinforce existing
distributions of wealth, power, and property rights, including water rights; and
they likewise assume that the propertied and the powerful dominate the legal
process. Therefore, these arguments conclude, general stream adjudications can
do effectively little to correct and to clarify rights to the subject stream and so
can hardly be worth the expense, especially given the arcane laws and inefficient
procedures which complicate the various property regimes of western water.11
Professor MacDonnell, an authority on Wyoming water law, has evaluated the
Big Horn Adjudication, and his conclusions are decidedly mixed.12
This article pursues the question of whether a water rights adjudication can
be justified, but in a very different region: the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer,
where an answer is urgently needed. The Ogallala is the largest but most rapidly
diminishing source of fresh water in the West. Groundwater pumping, almost
entirely for irrigation, has depleted the aquifer by 276 million acre-feet since it
began, and pumping over the past decade has only accelerated this depletion,
which stands at more than 8.3 million acre-feet annually.13 If these depletions
could open up a hole in the ground, that hole would swallow more than the entire
annual flow of the Snake River in a dry year, or almost four years of average Big
Horn flows.14 But such a whole could not be filled. Unlike the Snake and the Big

Id.; Bonny G. Colby, Assessing the Value of Adjudications in a World of Uncertainty: An
Economic Perspective, 10 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 327, 332–38 (2007). For a critique of costbenefit analysis in environmental law that could be extended to natural resources allocations and
adjudications, see generally Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental Law
and the Search for Objectivity (2010).
10

See, e.g., R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law 271–81 (5th ed. 1998); National
Water Commission, Water Policies for the Future (1973); Charles Meyers & R.A. Posner,
Market Transfers of Water Rights: Towards an Improved Market in Water Resources, Legal Study No. 4,
July 1, 1971, (Nat’l Water Comm’n 1973).
11

12
Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Rethinking the Use of General Stream Adjudications, 15 Wyo.
L. Rev. 347 (2015). Professor MacDonnell is the author of Treatise on Wyoming Water
Law (2014).
13
Leonard F. Konikow, Groundwater Depletion in the United States (1900–2008), at
4–5, 22 (U.S. Geological Survey 2013). I have converted Konikow’s figures from cubic kilometers
to acre-feet, the standard volumetric unit for measuring western water. (1 km2 = 810,713.194 acrefeet.) One acre-foot is 325,850 gallons.

The average annual flow of the Big Horn River in Wyoming (including the Wind and
Shoshone rivers) is 2,435,679 acre-feet. Wyoming State Geological Survey, Major Rivers of Wyoming,
http://www.wsgs.wyo.gov/research/water-resources/Major-Rivers.aspx (last visited July 9, 2015).
14
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Horn, whose river flows and groundwater basins rely upon substantial amounts
of annual precipitation (at least by western standards), the Ogallala mostly
holds fossil water from the last ice age. And that supply cannot be sustained
by recharge from precipitation, because across most of its range, Ogallala
recharge is effectively negligible.15 The obvious hydrological cause of these rapid
groundwater depletions is massive over-pumping; the less obvious legal cause
is over-appropriation, where the sum of all of the authorized use quantities for
Ogallala water rights and permits vastly exceeds the water supplies that the aquifer
can sustainably provide. As a result, perfectly legal pumping has overwhelmed
the Ogallala as a hydrological system, depleting groundwater baseflows so badly
that nearly all of the major perennial streams in Kansas west of the Hundredth
Meridian are now either dry or flow only ephemerally.16 Yet despite this severe
and permanent condition, groundwater depletion is a collective action problem,
and none of the states overlying the aquifer have ordered permanent reductions
in pumping, much less seen fit to commence a general adjudication to address the
problem of over-appropriation.17 In light of the experience of most general stream
adjudications farther west, such reticence is understandable. Logically, it seems
beyond reproach. If the principal purpose of a general stream adjudication is to

Snake River flows below Hells Canyon Dam have a minimum flow requirement of 9,200 cfs, or
6,660,800 acre-feet per year, and are usually considerably higher. Idaho Power, Hells Canyon River
Flows, https://www.idahopower.com/OurEnvironment/WaterInformation/Hellsrivflw/default.cfm
(last visited July 9, 2015).
Konikow, supra note 13, at 22; James A. Miller and Cynthia L. Appel, Groundwater
Atlas of the United States: Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska, Number HA 730-D (U.S.
Geological Survey 1997).
15

Kansas Geological Survey, Major Perennial Stream Changes from 1961 to 2009 (2012),
http://www.kgs.ku.edu/HighPlains/HPA_Atlas/Aquifer%20Basics/index.html#Perennial%252
0Stream%2520Changes%25201961%2520to%25202009.jpg (last visited July 9, 2015). The
Hundredth Meridian is the most well-known climatic boundary between the wetter, lower, eastern
portion of the Great Plains, and the higher, drier, western portion (usually described as the High
Plains), where agriculture generally requires irrigation. It bisects Nebraska about equally, and
separates the western third of Kansas from its eastern two-thirds. John Wesley Powell chose this
meridian because it roughly corresponded to where annual precipitation fell below twenty inches.
John Wesley Powell, Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States: With
a More Detailed Account of the Lands of Utah 12-13 (W. Stegner ed., 2d ed. 2004) (1879);
Wallace Stegner, Beyond the Hundredth Meridian: John Wesley Powell and the Second
Opening of the West 217 (1954). Later legislation such as the 1944 Flood Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 701–709, pushed the boundary farther east, by drawing the boundary between western
irrigation use and eastern navigation use at the 98th Meridian. In any case, the various formations
of the Ogallala Aquifer straddle these cartographic, climatic, and political divides.
16

17
This is not to say that western states have not reduced overall groundwater pumping.
Through federally subsidized programs such as the Conservation Reserve and Enhancement
Program (CREP), the Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP), and similar state and
locally funded programs, hundreds of thousands of acres of irrigated land have been temporarily
or permanently retired from irrigation across the Great Plains. However, the impetus behind such
retirements is principally to protect groundwater pumping at present levels on lands that remain
irrigated. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
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secure definite and durable water rights which the state can promptly protect by
priority administration when water runs short, then such a marathon proceeding
could never be justified, since most of the Ogallala is so obviously unsustainable.
If that logical proposition is correct, then the inquiry is over, and this article has
little purpose. Fortunately, however, the assumptions supporting this proposition
are not valid across the Ogallala. Recall Mr. Strong’s canny use of quotation
marks: a general stream adjudication should support the “effective management”
of scarce water resources.18 The objectives of a general adjudication and those
of “effective management” are interrelated and interdependent. Together, they
must account for the hydrological contexts, the historical contexts, the legal
regimes, and the major actors, which together impelled the commencement of the
particular adjudication. Across the Ogallala states, these contexts, regimes, and
actors are substantially different from those of the Rocky Mountain West, and
they raise encouraging possibilities for what a general stream/aquifer adjudication
might achieve on the Great Plains.
Such an adjudication need not labor under the burden of securing definite
and durable water rights, because carrying that burden would be hydrologically
impossible over the long term and therefore difficult to defend as both a legal end
and as a policy goal. Focusing on one of these attributes of an ideally adjudicated
Ogallala water right—definite or durable, rather than both—may be sufficient
and even preferable in many situations. A properly designed adjudication could
thus produce a portfolio of property rights in water that is better suited to the
aquifer’s hydrological characteristics.
Moreover, such an adjudication need not defer to the abstract dictates of t
he prior appropriation doctrine, especially where such deference would aid little
in the administration of adjudicated rights and the management of water supplies
upon which those rights depend. Otherwise, the doctrine would lose much of the
utility which gave it legitimacy in the first place. All Ogallala states apply some
version of the doctrine to surface waters, but their legal regimes for groundwater
vary considerably. Yet in states which follow different doctrines for surface water
and groundwater, as well as in states which enjoy doctrinal consistency for both
waters, the administration of water rights and the management of water supplies
have both proven to be inconsistent, legally difficult, and administratively
cumbersome. Within these diverse legal regimes, a general stream/aquifer
adjudication could perform the signal service of integrating the governing
doctrines with actual administration and management of water rights. That is,
after all, what modern general stream adjudications do: they have always, and
necessarily, confronted fundamental disruptions to the prior appropriation
system. They arose to address and to resolve the rights held by Native American
Strong, supra note 2, at 29. Mr. Strong is too judicious and experienced a lawyer to hazard
a definition of “effective management,” which is a politicized term.
18
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tribes—huge, abstract, and dominant tribal rights, rights imbued with their own
tribal sovereignty, based in federal law, often predating state law water rights, and
even dating to time immemorial.19 If a doctrine committed to temporal priority
can acknowledge, address, and resolve immemorial rights, it should be able to
do the same with impermanent ones. Furthermore, adjudications have similarly
addressed—and decreed—prior appropriation rights whose beneficial uses
contradict traditional doctrinal assumptions, such as instream flow rights.20 Uses
of water which courts would have dismissed as non-beneficial or even wasteful a
century ago, such as instream flows and in situ recreational rights, are embraced as
precious and even imperative today.21 Indeed, the magnitude of these disruptions
and others has led prominent water law scholars to question whether the doctrine
remains relevant or even operative.22
Finally, it is not preordained that an Ogallala adjudication should require
the lengthy, arduous, and expensive proceedings which have bedeviled and
discredited general stream adjudications farther west. The modern legal and
administrative regimes of the Ogallala states are generally well-equipped to assist
with a general stream/aquifer adjudication. For example, such an adjudication
would most likely not suffer the large burden of administratively unrecognized
claims—such as those in the Snake River Basin Adjudication, which incorporated
85,000 decreed claims that previously were not of record with the Idaho
Department of Water Resources.23 And where groundwater depletions and

See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336, 350 (D. Or. 1979) (decreeing the priority
of tribal water rights necessary to preserve hunting and fishing rights as of “time immemorial”), aff ’d
as modified by United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1410 (9th Cir. 1983).
19

20

Robison, supra note 6, at 308–18.

See, e.g., George S. Knapp et al., The Appropriation of Water for Beneficial Purposes:
A Report to the Governor on Historic, Physical, and Legal Aspects of the Problem in Kansas
52 (1944) (describing water left flowing in the stream as water wasted); less than forty years later,
the Kansas statutes described instream flows as sufficiently desirable to require the Chief Engineer
to withhold water from appropriation for their support, and to protect such flows according to their
statutory date of priority. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-703a (L. 1980, ch. 332, § 2) (2015).
21

22
See, e.g., Reed D. Benson, Alive But Irrelevant: The Prior Appropriation Doctrine in Today’s
Western Water Law, 83 U. Colo. L. Rev. 675 (2012); for a brief summary of the general positions,
see also Christine A. Klein, Water Bankruptcy, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 560, 566–81 (2012). Justice
Gregory J. Hobbs of the Colorado Supreme Court has been among the most knowledgeable and
forceful advocates of the doctrine within modern water management. See, e.g., Gregory J. Hobbs,
Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle, 32 Envtl. L. 37 (2002). Justice Hobbs’s
position tends to assume that the doctrine operates within a system of rolling adjudications, as in
Colorado water court; critics of that position tend not to acknowledge that context, or to ignore it.
Klein, at 576–81.
23
Strong, supra note 2, at 28. This large disparity is the result of Idaho law, which recognizes
both “statutory” water rights that were obtained in compliance with the Idaho permit statute, as
well as unadjudicated “constitutional use” water rights that were obtained by the user diverting
the water and putting it to beneficial use without administrative approval, as allowed under the
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surface water shortages are most pressing above the Ogallala, there are few
federal reserved water rights for tribes or for federal land, facts that should greatly
reduce the potential for lengthy and contentious negotiations and litigation, as
well as the necessity for congressional funding. Across these states, long-established
water use records, long-required metering requirements, and widely used
groundwater models should together be capable of resolving the most important
factual issues regarding past, present, and future water usage and supply. This
capability should significantly streamline the adjudicative process, providing solid
grounds for stipulation, negotiation, and settlement.
In sum, this article puts forth a hopeful and novel but realistic proposition,
one suited to the legal and hydrological realities of the Ogallala. Properly framed by
appropriate legislation, a general stream/aquifer adjudication can clarify property
rights in Ogallala water, especially by recognizing the undeniable distinctions and
boundaries between its different water supplies, and by decreeing rights to them
accordingly. It can do so in a manner that enables the holders to protect those
rights more effectively than they currently can, and can enable the state to better
manage its water supplies and protect the public interest. Finally, it can do so
in a reasonably timely manner. Such an adjudication is not only justifiable; it is
probably preferable to the current regimes for Great Plains water rights and water
resources management.
To serve that argument, this article discusses the potential for, and the potential
pitfalls of, a stream/aquifer adjudication, anchored mostly in the respective water
codes of Kansas and Nebraska, states which together hold nearly three-quarters of
the Ogallala’s total water supplies.24 Part II provides an analytic summary of the
traditional causes, goals, and consequences of general stream adjudications. Part III
describes the hydrology of the Ogallala and the varied legal history of its attendant
water codes, in order to explain how and why the causes, goals, and consequences
of an Ogallala stream/aquifer adjudication would differ significantly from those
of a typical general stream adjudication—largely because of the hydrological
and political dominance of groundwater. Within this groundwater-dominated
context, an adjudication must confront the two most pressing problems facing
the Ogallala region: the problem of the permanent depletion of the aquifer, and
the failure of both regulators and water rights holders across different legal regimes
to administer and to protect senior water rights. Part IV sets forth a generalized
vision for what such an adjudication must achieve in this context, to confront
and to resolve these conjoined problems of permanent depletion and of legal and
regulatory failure.
Idaho Constitution. Idaho Const. art. XV, § 3; Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 156 P.3d
502 (Idaho 2007). Since 1969 however, “constitutional” water rights fall behind statutory rights in
administration situations. Nettleton v. Higginson, 558 P.2d 1048 (Idaho 1977) (construing Idaho
Code Ann. § 42-607).
24

See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
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II. The Traditional Causes, Goals, and Consequences
of General Stream Adjudications
A. The Inherent and Historical Causes of General Stream Adjudications
The original cause of general stream adjudications is the over-appropriation
that has generally resulted from the operation of the prior appropriation doctrine.
That doctrine combines two elements which are in regular tension: that of
appropriation, which establishes the right originally, and assumes there is water
to obtain; and that of priority, which gives the right value against other rights
when water supplies run low. One who diverts water from its source, conveys that
water to its place of use, and applies that water to a beneficial use, appropriates
that water. The labor and industry of the appropriator, the social utility of
the appropriator’s water use, and the use of the water combine to produce an
appropriation right, which is a use right in the water so appropriated. (It is not
a right to the water itself.) This appropriative, predominantly private approach
to property rights in water derived from the mining customs of western gold
and silver camps during the middle of the nineteenth century, first in the Sierra
Nevada during the 1840s, and a decade or so later in the Rockies.25 Like those
mining customs, an appropriation right is based on labor and aligns with Lockean
property theory: labor, applied to a natural resource, produces property, which
can exist in a situation effectively without government. Individual initiative and
industry create the property right and give it legitimacy independent from the
State.26 In that spirit, state constitutions across the West recognize the right to
appropriate water, and they do so in non-historical and non-political terms: it is
inalienable, and it “shall never be denied.”27
Priority engages in times of shortage, which are frequent in the arid and
drought-prone West. During these times, appropriation rights are entitled to
protection not equitably, but according to the temporal priority of the relevant
appropriation rights. (That priority is usually established according to when the
appropriator first began to labor on his or her industrious diversion.) During
25
See generally Donald J. Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West: Water, Law, and
Public Policy, 1848-1902, at 11–68 (1992), and especially the sources upon which Pisani relies
(at 340–56); see also Robert G. Dunbar, Forging New Rights in Western Waters 60–63
(1983). For a sustained argument that the prior appropriation doctrine in Colorado represented
a progressivist response to the threat of land and water monopolies, see David B. Schorr, The
Colorado Doctrine: Water Rights, Corporations, and Distributive Justice on the American
Frontier (2012).
26
John Locke, Second Treatise
(ca. 1681).

of

Government §§ 26-45 (Peter Laslett, ed., 2000)

27
E.g., Colo. Const. art 2, § 3, art. 16, § 6 (1876); Idaho Const. art. 1, § 1, art. XV,
§ 3 (1890). These constitutional statements presume that the appropriation is for a beneficial use;
and what constitutes a beneficial use has evolved significantly since then. See supra note 21 and
accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol15/iss2/6

8

Griggs: General Stream Adjudications as a Property and Regulatory Model f

2015

Model for the Ogallala

421

the seminal period of western water law, courts first wrestled with the doctrine,
recognizing its extralegal pre-existence while refusing to approve it.28 But in less
than twenty years, both state supreme courts and the Supreme Court of the
United States conferred legal sanction on it, and in states such as Colorado, they
proclaimed it the exclusively operative doctrine. As a consequence, water rights
based upon the prior appropriation doctrine generally overcame rights rooted
in other doctrines, most importantly the riparian doctrines of English common
law; and that doctrinal victory was based on the widespread belief that prior
appropriation was well-suited to the water conditions of the West, which are
much more arid and much more variable than those in the East.29
However, the tension between appropriation and priority encouraged
claimants to claim more water than they needed. From the territorial period
into the twentieth century, individual irrigators intentionally made excessive
water rights claims to protect against potential incursions into their water usage;
and many, if not most, appropriators did not know the actual quantities of
their diversions or their claims, much less their needs.30 Irrigators also tended
to overstate their water use, misrepresent the acreages irrigated, and inaccurately
describe their diversion works, making it difficult to discern whether there was
water available to appropriate, and deterring new appropriations of water.31 As a
result of these errors, intentional and otherwise, the sum of water rights claimed
from a given stream could frequently exceed the available water supply by as
much as an order of magnitude—even among rights with decrees obtained under
early adjudication statutes.32 States were not blind to these garish levels of overappropriation; indeed, they conducted hundreds of stream adjudications across
the West during the twentieth century to correct them.33 But these early efforts
mostly failed in this regard, and so the original problem of over-appropriation
under state law has carried on as a distinct problem.34
A second cause of general stream adjudications arose from two fundamental
challenges to the established order of state law-based water rights under the prior
28

See, e.g., Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249 (1853).

Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855) (recognizing a prior appropriative right as superior to
a junior riparian right); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882) (recognizing the prior
appropriation doctrine as operative against rival doctrines); Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453 (1878).
For authoritative surveys of the doctrine, see generally Samuel C. Wiel, Water Rights in the
Western States 46–306 (1905); Wells A. Hutchins, Water Rights in the Nineteen Western
States 1.226–649 (1974); see also Pisani, supra note 25.
29

30

Mead, supra note 1, at 145–59 (on the over-appropriation problem in Colorado).

Michael McIntyre, The Disparity Between State Water Rights Records and Actual Water Use
Patterns: “I Wonder Where the Water Went?”, 5 Land & Water L. Rev. 22, 26–30 (1970).
31

32

Mead, supra note 1, at 145–59.

33

Thorson et al., 2005, supra note 3, at 408–24, 449–50.

Sandra Dunn, Cooperative Federalism in the Acquisition of Water Rights: A Federal
Practitioner’s Point of View, 19 Pac. L.J. 1323, 1323 (1988).
34
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appropriation doctrine. The first of these was the recognition of federal reserved
water rights. Starting with Winters v. United States in 1908, the Supreme Court
and federal courts established a federal common law of Native American reserved
water rights, which entitled tribes to very large, senior water rights under federal
law, against existing prior appropriation rights held under state law.35 Under
Winters, tribes were entitled to a quantity of water necessary for the present and
future needs of the tribe—usually for agriculture, by far the largest use—and
with a priority date of the treaty establishing the reservation, if not earlier.36 (The
priority date of the tribal right often predates the admission date of the state
in which the reservation is located.37) In the first several decades after Winters
was decided, state and federal courts applied its doctrine mostly to protect tribal
water rights which were necessary for various tribal irrigation projects.38 It was
not until 1963, when the Supreme Court delivered its decision in Arizona v.
California, that “the magnitude of the conflict between reserved rights and state
appropriative rights became clear.”39 The Court in that case not only reaffirmed
Winters, but approved the standard of “practicable irrigable acreage” (PIA),
which provided a method by which dormant and implied tribal rights could be
quantified for use on reservations.40 Arizona v. California and later cases applied
the reserved rights doctrine to non-tribal federal lands such as federal recreation

35
See generally John Shurts, Indian Reserved Water Rights: The Winters Doctrine in Its
Social and Legal Context, 1880s–1930s (2000).
36
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); see also United States v. Rio Grande
Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899) (asserting in dicta that a state cannot extinguish the right
of the United States, as a riparian owner, to the flow of water necessary for the beneficial uses of that
federal property). For a memorable jeremiad against the entire notion of federal reserved rights, see
Frank Trelease, Federal Reserved Rights since PLLRC, 54 Denv. L.J. 473 (1977).

See, e.g., Water Rights Compact Entered Into by the State of Montana, the Crow Tribe,
and the United States of America, Mont. Code. Ann. § 85-20-901 (ratified June 22, 1999), at art.
1 (recognizing a priority date for the Crow Tribe’s reserved water right of May 7, 1868, which is the
date of the establishment of the Crow Reservation under the (second) Treaty of Fort Laramie of the
same date). Montana entered the Union on November 8, 1889. 26 Stat. 1551 (Nov. 8, 1889).
37

Such a determination of necessity was usually done on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Byers
v. Wa-wa-ne, 169 P.121, 127–28 (Or. 1917) (distinguishing from Winters based on the finding
that no irrigation was necessary for successful agriculture on tribal lands); United States ex rel.
Ray v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909, 911–12 (D. Idaho 1928) (recognizing Winters rights according to tribal
needs, as against successors to Indian lands in the adjudication of Toponce Creek); United States v.
Powers, 16 F. Supp. 155, 164 (D. Mont. 1936), decree generally aff ’d in 94 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1938),
and 305 U.S. 527, 533 (1939) (reducing the tribal water duty from 1 miner’s inch per acre to ½
miner’s inch for tribal irrigation works on the Crow Reservation).
38

39

Peter W. Sly, Reserved Water Rights Settlement Manual 4 (1988).

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595–601 (1963). Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado
River, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 65–71 (1966). While the PIA method remains the default standard, it
has not been treated as the exclusive one for irrigation purposes. See, e.g., In re General Adjudication
of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source, 35 P.3d 68 (Ariz. 2001). For a
more recent analysis of the Winters doctrine, see Susan Williams, The Winters Doctrine on Water
Administration, 36 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 24-1 (1990).
40
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areas, wildlife refuges, and national forests.41 The recognition of these federal,
reserved rights intensified the problem of over-appropriation—especially in the
Southwest, where they threatened to displace state law-based appropriative rights
and absorb most of the available water supply if the reserved rights doctrine were
uniformly applied—while creating substantial uncertainty about the security of
state law-based appropriation rights.42
The establishment and assertion of reserved rights rendered the earlier
generation of stream adjudications into partial proceedings at best. Between the
size and priority of tribal rights, and the large amount of federal land in the West,
federal reserved rights extended to over fifty-two percent of western land.43 Federal
deference to state water law, born of the western states’ “deep-seated hostility to
federal dictation of water rights”44 and stated repeatedly in major federal water
legislation during the first half of the twentieth century, became little more than
a shibboleth in this context.45 Given the priority and the size of tribal water
claims, addressing those claims with the state has become the imperative first step
towards any successful general stream adjudication.46 Subsequent general stream
adjudications have proved up the quantity and the size of these federal claims.
For example, approximately 30,000 federal claims were filed in the Snake River
Basin Adjudication, by twelve different federal agencies, all of which accounted
for roughly twenty-five percent of the total claims in the adjudication.47

Arizona, 373 U.S. at 601; Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976); United
States v. New Mexico, 238 U.S. 696 (1978).
41

42
Sly, supra note 39, at 5; Thorson et al., 2006, supra note 3, at 306–08, 313–17, 331–37.
In reserved water rights adjudications on higher and wetter drainages, such as those in the Northern
Rocky Mountains, the recognition of federal reserved rights has not intensified the problem of
over-appropriation to such an extent, largely because such rights have frequently involved nonconsumptive uses in headwater areas, rather than consumptive uses (mostly for irrigation) in
downstream areas. For a discussion of such a situation in the Big Horn Adjudication, where the
tribes sought large instream flow rights on the Wind River, see Robison, supra note 6, at 289–307.

Thorson et al., 2006, supra note 3, at 311 (tabulating federal acreage with reserved water
rights in Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming).
43

44

Arizona, 373 U.S. at 612 (J. Harlan, dissenting).

Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, now codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (2015);
43 U.S.C. § 485h-4 (2015) (identical to Section 8); see also 43 U.S.C. § 390b(c) (2015) (Water
Supply Act provision incorporating Section 8).
45

Bonnie G. Colby, John E. Thorson, & Sarah Britton, Negotiating Tribal Water
Rights: Fulfilling Promises in the Arid West 57–77 (2005). However, it is worth noting that
a central feature of reserved water rights settlements (including state-tribal compacts) can be the
protection of (junior) state law-based appropriation rights from administration calls by the (senior)
tribal water right; and new development of the (senior) tribal water right (such as a post-settlement
reservoir) is, for purposes of exercising the right, often recognized as being junior in priority to those
state law-based appropriation rights. See, e.g., Montana-Crow Compact, supra note 37, arts. III–IV.
46

Testimony of David Shaw, chief of the adjudication bureau of the Idaho Department
of Water Resources (and the primary witness for the State of Idaho in the Snake River Basin
47
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The second legal challenge to the western states’ water rights regimes emerged
from the growing importance of public and environmental issues during the last
third of the twentieth century. Generally, this emergence substantially reduced
the amount of water available for both new and existing appropriations. In
California, the courts revived and applied the public trust doctrine to existing
prior appropriation rights.48 As the California Supreme Court held in the Mono
Lake case,
the state is not confined by past allocation decisions which may
be incorrect in light of current knowledge or inconsistent with
current needs. The state accordingly has the power to reconsider
all allocation decisions even though those decisions were made
after due consideration of their effect on the public trust.49
Seeing this opportunity, environmental plaintiffs have sought (so far with little
success) to leverage the potential power of the public trust doctrine in general
stream adjudications.50 Courts have also recognized, under the “public interest”
Adjudication), as cited in Appellate Brief of Respondent State of Idaho at 6, In Re The General
Adjudication of Rights to the Use of Water From the Snake River Basin Water System, (No. 19407),
1991 WL 11242536 (Idaho) (Appellate Brief ). These claims incurred filing fees of approximately
$10 million, producing a dispute over whether the United States was required to pay those fees
pursuant to the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666; the Supreme Court ruled for the United
States, holding that the statute’s prohibition on assessing costs against the United States extended to
such filing fees. United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1993).
48
The textbook authorities are Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892);
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970). For a recent survey of the applicability of the doctrine to western
waters, see Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines:
Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 Ecology L.Q.
53 (2010).
49
Nat’l Audubon Soc. v. Sup. Ct. of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 419 (1983). For a useful
commentary on how the doctrine has actually been applied in California—primarily at the agency
level—see Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative
State, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1099 (2012). For a rare application of the public trust doctrine to
groundwater, see United Plainsmen Ass’n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm., 247
N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
50
In Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. State, 911 P.2d 748 (Idaho 1995), environmental
plaintiffs moved to intervene, on the grounds that the public trust doctrine required the Snake River
Basin Adjudication court to consider the public trust as an element of each water right subject to the
adjudication. The Supreme Court of Idaho was receptive to the concept of the public trust doctrine,
pursuant to their earlier ruling in Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671
P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho 1983), but affirmed the lower court’s denial of that motion, on the grounds
that the state’s ownership of the water was not a question before the SRBA court, and that the
public trust doctrine “is not an element of a water right used to determine the priority of that right
in relation to the competing claims of other water right claimants.” Id.; see also Shokal v. Dunn, 707
P.2d 441, 447 n.2 (Idaho, 1985). The Idaho legislature subsequently banned the application of the
public trust doctrine to water rights, including adjudications. Idaho Code Ann. § 58-1203(2)(b)
(2015). The bill banning the application of the doctrine “went through the legislature faster than
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standard, the right of state agencies to reject applications to appropriate water if
such appropriations would impair water supplies necessary for aquatic habitat,
recreation, aesthetic beauty, and water quality, among other considerations.51
While the public trust doctrine is mostly confined to the administrative law of
California, the public interest standard generally applies across western water law;
however, it has proven to be a variable and often impotent restraint.52
The same could never be said for the Endangered Species Act (ESA).53
Justly regarded as “the pit bull of environmental law,” the ESA limits actions
that threaten to modify or destroy critical habitat for threatened or endangered
species—and as a result, can effectively govern the use of much of the water
supply that sustains that habitat.54 It arms successful plaintiffs with the powerful
and accessible weapon of injunctive relief.55 On major western drainages such
as the Klamath, the Sacramento, and the San Joaquin, actions taken under the
ESA have shut the headgates to irrigation projects holding large and senior state
law-based appropriation rights in dry years, to protect habitat for salmon, smelt,
and other aquatic species.56 In the Sacramento Bay Delta, actions taken under the
ESA to balance the water needs of endangered species and irrigation districts will
likely produce the most expensive water engineering projects undertaken since
the Central Arizona Project.57 The power of the ESA to effectively reduce water
allocations secured under the prior appropriation doctrine has even motivated
states to voluntarily reduce their collective water use, rather than to risk such a
powerful remedy.58
a kayaker going through Staircase Rapids on the South Fork of the Payette River at flood stage.”
James M. Kearney, Recent Statute Closing the Floodgates? Idaho’s Statutory Limitation on the Public
Trust Doctrine, 34 Idaho L. Rev. 91, 93 (1997) (quoting Pete Zimowsky, Batt Should Shoot This Bill
Down, Idaho Statesman 1C (Mar. 18, 1996)).
51
See, e.g., Shokal, 707 P.2d at 448–49 (construing the meaning of “public interest” under
Idaho water statutes).

Michelle Bryan, Hitching Our Wagon to a Dim Star: Why Outmoded Water Codes and
“Public Interest” Review Cannot Protect the Public Trust in Western Water Law, 32 Stan. Envtl. L.J.
283 (2013).
52

53

16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. (2015).

See, e.g., Steven P. Quarles, The Pit Bull Goes to School: The Endangered Species Act at
25: What Works?, 15 Envtl. F. 55, 55 (1998) (discussing the origins of the act’s reputation).
54

55
See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (enjoining construction
of a federal reservoir pursuant to Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536).
56
Holly D. Doremus and A. Dan Tarlock, Water War in the Klamath Basin: Macho
Law, Combat Biology, and Dirty Politics (2008); San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v.
Jewell, 747 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2014).
57
Bay Delta Conservation Plan, Public Draft 8–61 (November 2013), available at http://
baydeltaconservationplan.com/Libraries/Dynamic_Document_Library/Public_Draft_BDCP_
Chapter_8_-_Implementation_Costs_and_Funding_Sources.sflb.ashx (estimating capital outlays
and O&M outlays of approximately $25 billion combined).

Under the Platte River Recovery Implementation Program, the states of Colorado,
Wyoming, and Nebraska, together with the United States Department of Interior, cooperatively
58
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The scale of these two legal disruptions—the imposition of federal reserved
water rights and the intervention of mostly federal environmental law—have
justifiably raised the issue of whether state law-based prior appropriation systems
retain their effective legal and doctrinal primacy over western waters.59 As a matter
of both substantive law and its functional effect upon water rights, that remains
an open question.60 Regardless, these disruptions both dramatically increased
claims on western waters and reduced the amount of water effectively available to
satisfy those claims.
The third general cause of general stream adjudications was a matter of
procedural law: the availability and necessity of the modern adjudication procedure
itself. In 1952, Congress passed the McCarran Amendment, which waived the
sovereign immunity of the United States and provided its consent to be joined
in state court for the purpose of conducting general stream adjudications.61 As a
result, state courts obtained jurisdiction to adjudicate all of the different water
rights on a particular stream reach—rights obtained under state law, as well as
rights impliedly reserved under federal law. Subsequent United States Supreme
Court decisions ruled that the McCarran Amendment also applied to state court
adjudications of Indian reserved rights held in trust by the United States.62 As
with the recognition of reserved rights under Winters, it took time and judicial
construction to clarify how the McCarran Amendment would operate in practice:
the acceptability of various state court judicial processes, the extent of the waiver
of immunity and consent to joinder, and perhaps most importantly, the length
of the stream reach that would be sufficient to qualify as a “general stream
adjudication” and therefore engage the amendment in the first place.63
If federal reserved rights and federal environmental law have shifted much
of the effective water law of the American West in favor of federal interests and
federal power, the McCarran Amendment has enabled western states to push
back somewhat against those interests and that power.64 While the McCarran
manage flows in the Platte River Basin to protect endangered species habitat. See generally Platte
River Recovery Implementation Program, https://www.platteriverprogram.org (last visited July
9, 2015).
59
See David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws and
Local Decisions Eclipsed the States’ Role?, 20 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3 (2001).
60

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

43 U.S.C. § 666 (2015). For a summary of the conditions leading to the passage of the
McCarran Amendment, see Thorson et al., 2005, supra note 3, at 442–59.
61

Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Arizona
v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 559–71 (1983).
62

63
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618 (1963). For a summary of judicial construction of the
McCarran Amendment, see Thorson et al., 2006, supra note 3, at 331–37.
64
See, e.g., In re the General Adjudication Of All Rights To Use Water In The Big Horn
River System (Big Horn I), 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988) (determining the scope of tribal rights
and rejecting tribal claims for water rights dedicated to fishery, mineral, industrial, wildlife, and
aesthetic purposes).
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Amendment does not divest federal courts of jurisdiction over reserved rights
claims, the federal courts generally abstain in favor of state court proceedings.65
As a consequence, state courts have become the dominant forums in which the
federal doctrine of reserved water rights has evolved. That evolution has not been
entirely consistent, as the Big Horn Adjudication demonstrates. In Big Horn I,
the Wyoming Supreme Court declined to extend the reserved rights doctrine to
groundwater, even as it endorsed the logic of such an extension; that decision
runs counter to the developing majority opinion of state and federal courts.66
And in Big Horn III, the same court prohibited tribes from dedicating a portion
of their reserved rights award, which had been quantified under the PIA standard
(and which explicitly assumes consumptive use) for instream flow purposes to
support a tribal fishery.67 In both cases, the Wyoming Supreme Court effectively
asserted Wyoming state law (and the role of the State Engineer) to determine
many of the contours of the tribal reserved water right. Put another way, the Big
Horn Adjudication began as a case dedicated to quantifying the substantial federal
reserved water rights of the Eastern Shoshone and Northern Cheyenne Tribes;
but it evolved into a case focused largely on state law-based issues of water rights
regulation and administration.68

B. The Typical Goals of General Stream Adjudications
General stream adjudications seek to resolve the problems that made them
necessary in the first place. First, there is the problem of over-appropriation. Prior
appropriation rights have generally come into existence without a prospective

65

See generally Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 19.05[1] (Mitchie 2005).

Big Horn I, 753 P.2d 76, 99 (Wyo. 1988), aff ’d by an equally divided Court, Wyoming
v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989). Elsewhere across the West, state and federal courts have
extended the doctrine to groundwater. See, e.g., In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to
Use Water in the Gila River System and Source, 989 P.2d 739, 745, 747–48 (Ariz. 1999) (holding
that tribal reserved rights expressly extend to groundwater, and politely criticizing the Wyoming
Supreme Court for its opposite holding in Big Horn I ); Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty.
v. United States, 695 F.2d 559, 561 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (denying the availability of the Salt River to
fulfill tribal rights on the grounds that the Gila River and groundwater were the intended sources for
tribal irrigation); Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968), and Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Stults, 59 P.3d 1093, 1099 (Mont. 2002) (both refusing to exclude
groundwater from the reserved rights doctrine); United States v. Washington Dep’t of Ecology, 375
F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1058 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (holding that Winters rights extend to groundwater on
the Lummi Reservation). For a discussion of tribal rights to groundwater generally, see Judith V.
Royster, Indian Tribal Rights to Groundwater, 15 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 489 (2006).
66

67
In re the General Adjudication Of All Rights To Use Water In The Big Horn River System
(Big Horn III), 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992).
68
John C. Schumacher, Esq., Big Horn Adjudication: Decades In The Making 9, 15
(Sept. 11, 2014) (unpublished paper presented at Big Horn Adjudication Symposium, Riverton,
Wyoming) (on file with author). Mr. Schumacher represented the Eastern Shoshone Tribe in the Big
Horn Adjudication from 1985 through 2010.
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regard for other rights or needs.69 This is especially the case in states that recognize a
constitutional right to appropriate water.70 The adjudicative process scrutinizes all
of these putative water rights; those that survive are placed within the operational
and administrative context of all of the other valid rights on the stream system,
within that system’s water budget. Ideally, the total authorized quantity of the
adjudicated rights is equivalent to that budget. To meet that budget, water rights
of all priorities can be effectively readjusted. Those with the largest and oldest
rights—typically tribal rights, which exist under the Winters doctrine and its
progeny—dominate the litigation and negotiation of any adjudication which
concerns an area with tribal lands.71 The adjudication may reduce the authorized
quantity of senior state law-based appropriation rights, if the record shows that
their water demands can be met with less water; such a reduction is justified on
the grounds that no appropriator has a right to waste.72 Reductions in such senior
rights can then be assigned to junior rights, softening the blow of the adjudicative

This was one of Mead’s principal laments. The most senior rights on a given western stream,
which took most or all of its available water supply, were usually dedicated to direct diversion for
irrigation, making it difficult to establish dependable storage rights, since the latter inevitably held
junior priorities. As a consequence, in dry periods when stored water was most needed, it was least
available. Mead, supra note 1, at 170–71.
69

Three examples illustrate variations of this problem and how they have been resolved.
Colorado recognizes the constitutional right of prior appropriation (Colo. Const. art XVI, §§ 5,
6) and does not have an administrative permitting system. Through the common law and the decree
process, it has produced the following general rule: senior but non-decreed water rights are junior
to decreed water rights. In this situation, the date of the relevant adjudication provides the operative
date of priority against such non-decreed, albeit historically senior rights. See, e.g., Luis Coppa &
Son v. Kuiper, 467 P.2d 273, 276 (Colo. 1970). For Idaho, where the administrative permitting
system overlays the multitude of “constitutional” rights, rights obtained through the former take
priority over the latter, see supra note 23 and accompanying text. The New Mexico Court of Appeals
faced a difficult case in which the priority doctrine, established under Article XVI, Section 2 of the
New Mexico Constitution, clashed with the state’s domestic well statute (N.M. Stat. Ann. 1978
§ 72-12-1.1 (2003)), which required the granting of groundwater rights for domestic use upon
application to the State Engineer. Plaintiffs, who owned senior water rights, argued that the statute
was an impermissible exception to the priority doctrine. The Court of Appeals upheld the statute,
largely by distinguishing the “broad priority principle” of the doctrine from the regulatory system
of administering water rights according to priority in times of shortage; the statute was thus a
permissible exception to, and not a facial violation of, the constitutional doctrine of priority, as long
as senior rights were protected from impending impairment by domestic wells permitted pursuant
to the statute. Bounds v. State Engineer, 252 P.3d 708, 721 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011), aff ’d in Bounds
v. D’Antonio, 306 P.3d 457 (N.M. 2013).
70

71

The Big Horn Adjudication exemplifies this dominance. See Robison, supra note 6,

at 278.
John C. Peck, Groundwater Management in Kansas: A Brief History and Assessment, 15 Kan.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 441, 451–52 (2006) (describing the reduction of senior rights in the Walnut
Creek Intensive Groundwater Use Control Area in Kansas).
72
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process. Because junior rights bear the brunt of this corrective blow, those who
hold them have little or no incentive to pursue an adjudication.73
By confronting the problem of over-appropriation, adjudications also serve
as a tool to establish political, jurisdictional, and administrative boundaries.
Interstate conflicts over interstate water supplies have produced adjudications
of their own, under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court.74 Litigation and negotiation performed under the Court’s
supervision have generated the basic rules by which these boundaries between
sovereigns, and their respective limits of water usage, have been set.75 Through a
combination of litigation and negotiation, states have adjusted their mechanisms
for quantifying and allocating their respective allocations in response to the
over-appropriation that has resulted from groundwater pumping.76 Interstate
adjudications have also clarified the respective duties of state engineers and local
water districts with respect to the administration of groundwater rights.77 Tribes,
D.L. Sanders, Esq., Presentation at Big Horn Adjudication Symposium, Riverton,
Wyoming (Sept. 11, 2014) (notes on file with author). Mr. Sanders served as Chief Counsel to the
New Mexico State Engineer from 2001 until his retirement in 2014.
73

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2015). The Court clearly views these
disputes as adjudications, even in the context of interstate compact disputes. See, e.g., Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546, 564 (1963) (Court has the “serious responsibility to adjudicate cases
where there are actual existing controversies over how interstate streams should be apportioned
among states.”).
74

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 85 (1907) (asserting the power of the Court to equitably
apportion interstate waters); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 359 U.S. 589, 618 (1945) (setting forth the
Court’s multi-factor analysis for equitable apportionment); Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176,
183 (1982) (restating the modern formulation for equitable apportionment); Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546 (1963) (holding that Congress has the power to apportion interstate waters through
federal legislation other than an interstate compact); for interstate compact jurisprudence, see
generally Douglas A. Grant, Water Apportionment Compacts Between States, in Water and Water
Rights §§ 46-1 to 46-30 (2010). For a recent interstate compact case which often resembles an
adjudication, see Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137, Original, Second Report of the Special Master
(Liability Issues) 99–220 (Dec. 29, 2014) (detailing specific water rights at issue in Wyoming and
Montana that are affected by alleged violations of the Yellowstone River Compact).
75

76
Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado, No. 126 Orig., Final Settlement Stipulation (Dec.
15, 2002).
77
Colorado attempted to regulate groundwater pumping in the Arkansas River Basin in the
1960s, but these attempts were stymied by the Colorado Supreme Court. Kansas’ lawsuit against
Colorado to enforce the Arkansas River Compact eventually forced Colorado either to require
curtailment of post-compact groundwater development or to replace the depletions caused by overpumping. (The fact that the waters of the Arkansas River Basin in Colorado are legally classified
as tributary groundwater, and thus within the jurisdiction of the State Engineer, only serves to
emphasize this point.) Kansas v. Colorado, No. 105 Orig., First Report of the Special Master
118–19 (July 1994). See also, e.g., Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. 2005) (stating
the jurisdictional boundaries between the State of Nebraska’s Department of Natural Resources
and the state’s Natural Resources Districts, and setting forth the appropriate test for equitable
treatment between senior surface water rights and junior groundwater permits); Upper Black
Squirrel Creek Ground Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Goss, 993 P.2d 1177, 1186 (Colo. 2000) (holding
that in in a designated basin, the local groundwater management district, not the State Engineer,
has administrative responsibility).
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as sovereign entities distinct from the states in which their reservations are located,
have also compacted with states to establish their respective supplies.78
Most importantly, adjudications provide legal and financial leverage by
which those with large but indefinite water rights can obtain wet water. For all of
their variations, interstate adjudications, general stream adjudications, and tribal
water rights settlements have all served to effectuate previously inchoate water
rights. The United States has long been concerned about securing permanent
water rights for federal irrigation projects.79 It has required western states to enter
into interstate compacts as a condition for constructing federal irrigation and
flood control projects, so that those projects rest upon permanent and concrete
allocations of states’ respective water supplies.80 General stream adjudications and
tribal water rights settlements secure federal legislation, including appropriations
funding, to satisfy tribal water rights entitlements.81 Typically, that funding
supports new or expanded water projects for tribal uses, and the purchase or lease
of pre-existing water rights from non-tribal members, which are then transferred
to tribal use. Decrees also specify the procedures by which junior water rights will
be administered to protect senior tribal rights during times of water shortage.82

C. The Consequences of General Stream Adjudications
The general (and idealized) goal of general stream adjudications is a
balanced system. The system has a balanced water budget: existing uses and
reserved rights do not exceed the available water supply, including storage. To
achieve that balance, the overall adjudication process pursues both sides of the
water supply ledger. (Ideally, the quantity of tribal water rights and other large
reserved rights have been established through a negotiated settlement; litigating
these issues, it is generally agreed, is a bad idea.83) On the supply side, the parties

78

See supra note 37 and accompanying text.

The Reclamation Act of 1902 is a prominent example of this concern. Section 8 of the
original Reclamation Act expressly defers to state law water rights regimes, but with an important
proviso: water rights obtained under state law for Reclamation projects “shall be appurtenant to the
land irrigated . . . .” 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (2015).
79

80
President Franklin D. Roosevelt vetoed the penultimate version of the Republican River
Compact, on the grounds that it sought to redefine the river as non-navigable, and so it did not
“specifically reserve to the United States all of the rights and responsibilities which it now has in the
use and control of the waters of the basin.” 77th Cong., 2 sess., H. Doc. 690, at 2 (Apr. 2, 1942).
The states amended the compact accordingly, recognizing these federal rights, and the compact was
approved by Congress and signed into law by President Roosevelt later that year. Republican River
Compact, 57 Stat. 86 (May 26, 1943).

See Colby et al., supra note 46, Appendix, 171–76 (2005) (listing the principal elements of
tribal water rights settlements).
81

82

Id. at 57–103.

83

Thorson et al., 2006, supra note 3, at 459–60, and the articles cited therein at note 1009.
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to adjudications seek to secure funding for increased storage projects, which
by making more water available, can mitigate the losses to junior water rights
holders. Parties can also seek protections for water made available by rotated
fallowing, increases in irrigation efficiency such as center pivot and drip
irrigation, and other mechanisms.84 On the demand side, the adjudication court
or officer often reduces wasteful or excessive senior rights, reduces the authorized
quantities of junior rights, and strikes unmerited claims to water altogether. As
a consequence of this hydrological balancing, many, if not most, of the water
rights on the stream system suffer reductions in their authorized quantities of
property rights. Without playing down that quantitative loss (which can be
largely composed of “paper water” which juniors have not dependably used),
junior rights can gain an increase in the quality of their rights. They gain added
legal security and certainty of title as decreed rights, and their rights become
more enforceable as a result of the decree’s administration provisions. Perhaps
most importantly, because these rights have been accurately quantified, judicially
secured, and made predictably enforceable, they should become more marketable,
thereby aiding the reallocation of water supplies from lower-value to higher-value
uses. It is difficult to justify adjudications solely on the grounds that they repair
the broken mathematics of an over-appropriated system. As a means towards a
water market, however, an adjudication can be a crucial step.85
Yet for all of this apparent utility, the results of general stream adjudications
have been mixed at best, and impressively inefficient. They have taken decades;
they have cost hundreds of millions of dollars; and they have been the source
of enduring disappointment and frustration, especially among the tribes whose
federal reserved rights compelled the adjudications in the first place. A sample of
these adjudications across the West provides some humbling numbers. Arizona
commenced its Gila River General Stream Adjudication in 1974, in which
approximately 82,000 claims were filed; four decades later, it is only one-third
complete. In 1978, Arizona commenced its Little Colorado General Stream
Adjudication, in which approximately 14,000 claims were filed; it is approximately
fifty-five percent complete.86 Montana initiated its general stream adjudication in
84
James P. Merchant, Making Water Available for Indian Water Rights Settlements, in Colby et
al., supra note 46, at 95–103.
85
See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions
Collective Action (1990); William Blomquist, Dividing the Waters: Governing
Groundwater in Southern California (1992); Thorson et al., 2006, supra note 3, at 457–58.
It should be noted that Ostrom and Blomquist generally anchor their findings in California, an
outlier legal regime for groundwater. For more skeptical assessments, see Joseph W. Dellapenna, The
Importance of Getting Names Right: The Myth of Markets for Water, 25 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. &
Pol’y Rev. 317 (2000); Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property
Solution, 78 U. Colo. L. Rev. 533 (2007).

for

Weldon, supra note 5; see generally The Judicial Branch of Arizona, Maricopa County,
Arizona’s General Stream Adjudications, http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/SuperiorCourt/
GeneralStreamAdjudication/Index.asp (last visited July 9, 2015).
86
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1979; as of 2004, it had invested more than $37.5 million in those proceedings,
and still harbors hopes of adjudicating approximately 219,000 water rights by
2028.87 New Mexico initiated thirteen distinct adjudications between 1956 and
1970, and all of them remain pending; these proceedings are “leviathans,” which
cost the state $2.8 million annually for staffing.88 Oregon commenced the Klamath
River Basin Adjudication in 1975, and completed just the administrative phase of
the adjudication in 2013, having determined the validity of 730 claims to the surface
waters of that basin, against 5,600 protests to those claims. The judicial phase of
the Klamath adjudication will produce a decree enabling the administration of
the decreed rights.89 The State of Washington initiated the Yakima River Basin
(Acquavella) Adjudication in 1977, to adjudicate approximately 3,000 water
rights, a relatively small number by the standards of these other adjudications;
it finally concluded in 2013.90 If general stream adjudications are necessary and
vital undertakings, their time and expense reveal the political, cultural, historical,
technical, and legal difficulties that can bedevil their completion.91

III. The Unusual Situations of the Ogallala
This brief summary of general stream adjudications should give us pause. On
one hand, they are imperative proceedings, to resolve the disruptions caused by the
most powerful doctrines in western water law, and they are justified proceedings,
at least according to their champions. On the other hand, the inevitable resolution
of these disruptions makes them unpopular with the majority of water rights
holders—those with junior rights, who have everything to lose. They have also
met with disapproval by those with the most senior rights, the tribes.92 They have
required exceedingly lengthy and expensive proceedings, and they have plunged
parties and presiding judges alike into existential despair.93 For better and for

87
Tarlock, supra note 9, at 52, 53; The Honorable Bruce Loble, Presentation at Big Horn
Adjudication Symposium, Riverton, Wyoming (Sept. 11, 2014) (notes on file with author).
88

Sanders, supra note 73.

See Findings of Fact and Order of Determination, In the Matter of the Determination of
the Relative Rights to the Use of the Waters of Klamath River and its Tributaries (Mar. 7, 2013),
available at http://www.oregon.gov/owrd/ADJ/docs/7_Findings_of_Fact_and_Order_of_
Determination.pdf.
89

90
Washington Dep’t of Ecology v. Acquavella, 296 P.3d 835 (Wash. 2013); see Washington
Department of Ecology, Water Right Adjudications, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/rights/
adjhome.html (last visited July 9, 2015).
91

Thorson et al., 2006, supra note 3, at 483–84.

92

MacDonnell, supra note 12, at 380.

See, e.g., Thorson et al., 2006, supra note 3, at 302–03 (quoting Judge Allen Minker, the
presiding judge in Arizona’s Little Colorado River Adjudication, comparing himself to a French
canal-digger); Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable 179 (English ed. 1958) (“ . . . you must go on, I
can’t go on, I’ll go on.”).
93
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worse, the prospect of adjudicating rights to the water supplies of the Ogallala
states presents a series of situations which are both unusual and importantly
different from those of general stream adjudications farther west.

A. The Physical and Legal Situations of the Ogallala Aquifer
The Ogallala Aquifer presents a physical situation that is distinct from
most other western water supplies in two important characteristics. The first
characteristic concerns hydrology. Most of the stream systems of the West originate
in its mountain ranges, such as the Wind River Range or the Bighorn Mountains.
These systems receive their water supply from precipitation, predominantly from
snowfall that accumulates at higher elevations, is stored there as snowpack and
seasonal groundwater, and then releases into tributaries during spring thaws. This
water supply varies a great deal from year to year, much more so than in the
East.94 Nonetheless, in wet years and dry years alike, these systems do answer to
the annual hydrological cycle.95 The second characteristic concerns topography.
Because western rivers such as the Bighorn cut through mountains, creating
canyons and valleys in the process, their water is often located at some distance
from arable land.96 Much of western water law serves these two distinctively
western imperatives: the need to accommodate annual climatic variability through
the priority system, and the need to protect the investment in diversion works
which transport water from their source, often over great distances, to the place
of use.97 The Ogallala, however, presents a fundamentally different situation.
Unlike the annual variability and annual replenishment of western surface water
supplies, the waters of the Ogallala Formation were deposited in geological time,
between the formation of the Rocky Mountains millions of years ago and the
retreat of glaciers and streams during the last ice age, tens of thousands of years
ago.98 Topographically, the Ogallala is diffused across much of the Great Plains,
providing a readily accessible water supply to those who own or farm land above
it—easily arable land, and land blessed with high-quality soils. It provides a
large and stable water supply directly beneath rich farm ground; such friendly

94
Douglas L. Grant and Gregory S. Weber, Cases and Materials on Water Law 3 n.3
(8th ed. 2010).
95
Thomas C. Winter, Judson W. Harvey, O. Lehn Franke, & William M. Alley,
Groundwater and Surface Water: A Single Resource 2–5 (U.S. Geological Survey ed., 1998).

Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 456 (1922) (describing the transbasin diversion of
flows from the Laramie River-North Platte River system in Wyoming to the Cache la Poudre-South
Platte River system in Colorado).
96

97

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.

Rex C. Buchanan, B. Brownie Wilson, Robert R. Buddemeier, & James J. Butler, Jr.,
The High Plains Aquifer, 18 Kansas Geological Survey, Public Information Circular 1, 1–2
(Jan. 2015).
98
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conditions, so dramatically different than those farther west, would not have
produced the prior appropriation doctrine.99
Water law across the Great Plains thus developed in fits and starts to
accommodate the exceptional conditions of the Ogallala, and to exploit its
bountiful water supply.100 Aside from the South Platte and Arkansas rivers, there
was little irrigation development across the lands of the southern Great Plains
between the territorial period and the Dust Bowl era.101 The High Plains river
systems could not really support extensive irrigation projects; this was almost
exclusively dryland farm country, “next year” country.102 As groundwater irrigation
became more prominent in the 1930s and 1940s, it began to expose doctrinal
and jurisdictional problems across the Ogallala. In the “pure” prior appropriation
regime of Colorado, the 1943 adjudication statute did not address groundwater,
and the Colorado Supreme Court issued a series of decisions between 1951 and
1963 which produced significant confusion about both doctrine and jurisdiction,
while attempting to distinguish alluvial groundwater supplies from those of the
Ogallala and other non-tributary sources.103
Similar problems arose in the water law regimes of Kansas and Nebraska,
whose water resources development began in the wet and humid east before
moving westward into the dry High Plains. Eastern Kansas originally followed the
riparian doctrine, in accordance with its adoption of the English Common Law
at statehood, but adopted the prior appropriation doctrine for western Kansas as
early as 1866, by statute in 1876, and reaffirming that statute with a notice-posting

99
See, e.g., Erasmus Haworth, Underground Waters
(U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey eds., 1897).

of

Southwestern Kansas 46–47

100
This and the following two paragraphs largely rely upon a more detailed commentary in
Burke W. Griggs, Beyond Drought: Water Rights in the Age of Permanent Depletion, 62 Kan. L. Rev.
1263, 1275–96 (2014).

For the Arkansas River, see James Earl Sherow, Watering the Valley: Development
High Plains Arkansas River, 1870–1950 (1991). The Republican River Basin, which
occupies a large part of the area between the South Platte River and the Arkansas River basins, had
very little surface irrigation, although it did contain some legally important diversion works. See,
e.g., Weiland v. Pioneer Irrigation Co., 259 U.S. 498 (1922).
101

along the

102
Donald Worster, Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s, at 26 (1979); Craig
Miner, Next Year Country: Dust to Dust in Western Kansas, 1890–1940 (2006).

Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 148-9-1 to -27 (1963) (repealed); Safranek v. Town of Limon, 228
P.2d 975, 977 (Colo. 1951) (all groundwater presumed to be tributary and subject to the prior
appropriation doctrine); Whitten v. Coit, 385 P.2d 131, 139 (Colo. 1963) (Colorado Ground
Water Law of 1957 did not confer authority upon the state engineer to adjudicate and administer
rights to non-tributary groundwater); City of Colorado Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552, 555 (Colo.
1961) (asserting judicial responsibility over tributary groundwater). See Justice Gregory J. Hobbs,
Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, 1 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 1, 20–22 (1997); see also
Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Colorado’s 1969 Adjudication and Administration Act: Settling In, 3 U.
Denv. Water L. Rev. 1, 12–14 (1999).
103
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statute in 1886.104 For the next six decades, Kansas water law was a compound of
eastern riparian and western prior appropriation doctrines; by the 1940’s, it had
become an increasingly unstable one, especially regarding groundwater.105 Kansas
comprehensively rewrote its water code to address these problems in 1945.106 The
1945 Kansas Water Appropriation Act repudiated riparianism, and extended the
prior appropriation doctrine to the entire state and to all of its waters, including
groundwater; it granted to the Chief Engineer of the Division of Water Resources
(DWR) jurisdiction over all of the waters of Kansas, and established mechanisms
for recognizing water rights established before 1945.107 Kansas did succeed in
adjudicating approximately 5,000 of these pre-1945, “vested” rights.108
Nebraska water law also developed as a legal hybrid, but unlike Kansas, it has
remained one. Nebraska embraced the prior appropriation doctrine for surface
waters in 1889, and constitutionalized the doctrine in 1920; but it has never
extended that doctrine to groundwater, which remains governed by the doctrine
of correlative rights.109 Jurisdictionally, Nebraska has maintained a similar divide
between surface water and groundwater: the state Department of Natural
Resources (DNR) regulates the former (under the prior appropriation doctrine)
while local Natural Resources Districts (NRDs) regulate the latter (under the
correlative rights doctrine.)110 And while Nebraska did conduct adjudications
during the early twentieth century, the existing statutory adjudication process
appears to be limited to forfeiture proceedings, and does not contain a method
for converting riparian uses into appropriative rights.111

B. The Causes of a Potential Aquifer Adjudication
For all of this legal and doctrinal variety, the original cause of the earlier
generations of adjudications farther west—that of over-appropriation—

104

1876 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 58; Clark v. Allaman, 80 P. 571, 572 (Kan. 1905).

State ex rel. Peterson Co. v. Board of Agric., 149 P.2d 604, 607–09 (Kan. 1944) (declaring
Kansas water law ineffectual regarding groundwater).
105

106
See Knapp et al., supra note 21, passim; the committee’s draft legislation was almost entirely
adopted in the Kansas Water Appropriation Act, 1945 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 390, § 1 et seq., codified
at Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-701 et seq. (2015).

Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 82a-702, -706, -716 (2015) (authorizing and setting forth the
duties of the Chief Engineer); Id. §§ 82a-704a to -704b (providing procedures for determining
vested rights).
107

John C. Peck, The Kansas Water Appropriation Act: A Fifty-Year Perspective, 43 Kan. L.
Rev. 735, 744 (1995). Vested rights remain fraught with potential complications.
108

1889 Neb. Sess. Laws 503–04; Neb. Const. art. XV, § 6 (1920); Osterman v. Cent.
Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 268 N.W. 334 (Neb. 1936).
109

110
In re Metro. Util. Dist. of Omaha, 140 N.W.2d 626, 637 (Neb. 1966); Spear T Ranch v.
Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. 2005).
111

Thorson et al., 2006, supra note 3, at 416–17.
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remained, and intensified during the 1960s, ecumenical in its sweep across the
Ogallala states. Yet the original over-appropriation of the Ogallala is peculiar
and difficult: it is an over-appropriation not in quantity, but in time. Where the
over-appropriation endemic to a typical western stream system is a problem in
which the authorized quantities of all of the water rights exceed the annual and
durable quantity of that stream system, the original over-appropriation of the
Ogallala is a problem in which the authorized quantities of all of the groundwater
rights then in existence did not, for a time, exceed what the aquifer could provide.
At the time those rights were granted, the supply was there, large enough to avoid
impairing prior rights; consequently, the law typically required new groundwater
rights to be issued, so that water could be put to beneficial use pursuant to the
prior appropriation doctrine.112 Problems that might ensue according to the other
half of that doctrine—priority—could be put off for a later time.
That procrastination was intentional and economically rational in the short
term, but it produced the second cause of a potential aquifer adjudication: a much
higher level of over-appropriation, which resulted from softening the dictates of
priority. As the groundwater revolution spread across the Great Plains during
the 1950s and 1960s, state legislatures amended their water codes to enable the
development of the Ogallala’s water supplies, largely by removing legal obstacles
that might have frustrated such development.
Kansas led the way, amending its Water Appropriation Act in 1957 by
effectively placing the principle of beneficial use above that of priority. It did
so by redefining what the Chief Engineer must consider in evaluating whether
an application for a new water right might impair a senior right. The original
act defined impairment in absolute hydrologic terms, including declines in
groundwater levels caused by junior rights.113 Yet within this context of reviewing
new applications for water rights, the 1957 amendments redefined impairment
in economic terms, as impairment “beyond a reasonable economic limit.” This
change thus required the Chief Engineer to approve an application for a junior
right, even if that right would interfere hydrologically with senior rights, as long
as that interference was not economically unreasonable.114 This redefinition,
combined with the as-yet under-tapped bounties of the aquifer and DWR’s lack
of concern over long-term water supply availability, produced a level of over-

112

See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-711 (2015) (1945 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 390, § 11).

113

Id.

Id. § 82a-711(c) (1957 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 539, § 16). If the applicant makes such a
showing, the Chief Engineer is required to approve the application. Id. § 82a-711(a). It should be
noted, however, that other statutes concerning impairment do not define it in economic terms. Id.
§ 82a-708b(a)(2) (changes in water rights must not impair existing rights); Id. § 82a-717a (junior
rights cannot impair senior rights). The Kansas Court of Appeals has recently made this distinction
clear. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
114
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appropriation across the Kansas portions of the Ogallala that would not have
otherwise occurred.115
Other Ogallala states made similar compromises. Colorado, which endured
substantial litigation in the 1950s and 1960s concerning the protection of rights
to the Ogallala,116 legislatively removed the waters of the Ogallala from the
other waters of the state, and placed these waters in the newly created category
of “designated groundwater.”117 Like Kansas groundwater rights, designated
groundwater wells in Colorado were not entitled to the maintenance of historical
water levels; but unlike them, designated groundwater permits did not obtain
the status of water rights.118 Oklahoma repealed the 1949 Oklahoma Ground
Water Law and its priority system in 1973, replacing it with a permitting system
in which permits were granted according to the proportionate share of the
overlying land.119 Nebraska never embraced the prior appropriation doctrine for
groundwater, so it has never needed to commit such compromises.120
These two causes—over-appropriation in time, and much greater overappropriation as a matter of short-term policy—were self-inflicted. In this regard,
the states of the Ogallala have much in common with states farther west.
The Ogallala states do not, however, face the challenges of federal reserved
water rights, whose coming of age during the 1960s and 1970s compelled so many
general stream adjudications. As a general rule, the Ogallala lies beneath very little
federal and tribal land, and so is subject to far fewer federal reserved water rights
claims. Nearly sixty-two percent of Idaho is federal land, and tribes hold over
642,000 acres of land there; for Wyoming, the numbers are forty-eight percent
and over 1.9 million acres respectively. 121 By contrast, less than one percent of
Kansas is federal land—the lowest level in the nation—and its four tribes hold a
total of 7,200 acres. Nebraska’s numbers are similar, at 1.1 percent and 23,800
115

See Griggs, supra note 100, at 1284–86.

116

See supra note 103 and accompanying text.

117

1965 Ground Water Management Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 37-90-103(6)(a) (2015).

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-102(1) (2015); Id. §§ 37-90-107, -108. The Kansas legislature
redefined water rights in 1957 as real property rights—even as it redefined them to guarantee their
impermanence. 1957 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 539, § 1 (current version at Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-701(g)
(Supp. 2014)). For a discussion, see Griggs, supra note 100, at 1284–86, 1310–19.
118

119
Wells A. Hutchins, Water Rights
436–39 (2004).

in the

Nineteen Western States, III, at

120
See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. Like other Ogallala states, Nebraska did
enact legislation in the 1960s and 1970s conveying regulatory authority over groundwater to local
districts. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 2-3201 et seq. (1970).
121
Ross W. Gorte, Carol Hardy Vincent, Laura A. Hanson, & Marc R. Roseblum,
Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data 3–7 (Congressional Research Service, Feb. 8,
2012); National Research Council of Maine, Public Land Ownership by State, http://www.nrcm.
org/documents/publiclandownership.pdf (last visited July 9, 2015).
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acres respectively.122 And what federal land does exist across the expanses of the
Great Plains are national grasslands managed by the United States Forest Service,
lands whose purposes would require little or no reserved water rights. These
are, for the most part, the lands most devastated by the Dust Bowl.123 Had the
Arapaho, the Cheyenne, and especially the Comanche Tribes been forced onto
reservations corresponding with their historic territories, these states would likely
be facing massive tribal water rights settlements over Ogallala supplies.124
Similarly, the public trust doctrine, public interest concerns, and
environmental law, which together disrupted a century of relatively settled
western water law and reduced the amount of water available for diversion across
the West, have had comparatively little effect upon groundwater management
across the states of the Ogallala. With one prominent exception, the public trust
doctrine has obtained almost no judicial traction across the Great Plains.125 Nor
has the public interest standard for evaluating groundwater rights and permits
constrained groundwater over-development, since the states’ understanding of the
public interest supported granting such rights in the first place.126 As for the ESA,

122

Public Land, supra note 121.

123

Worster, supra note 102, at 30.

For example, the traditional range of the Comanche in southwestern Kansas overlies most
of what is today Southwest Kansas Groundwater Management District No. 3, the largest such
district in the state, as well as the eastern plains of southern Colorado, eastern New Mexico, and the
Oklahoma and Texas panhandles. Pekka Hamalainen, The Comanche Empire 176 (2008) (map by
Bill Nelson showing the extent of the Comancheria Empire on the eve of the Mexican War).
124

125
United Plainsmen Ass’n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm., 247 N.W.2d
457 (N.D. 1976). The Supreme Court of Kansas refused to apply the doctrine in a case involving
public stream access for recreational purposes, and expressly distinguished that situation from one
involving water rights, whether for consumptive or non-consumptive recreational use. State ex rel.
Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1363– 65 (Kan. 1990). In United States v. Burlington N. R.R. Co.,
710 F. Supp. 1286, 1287 (D. Neb. 1989) the federal district court for the State of Nebraska denied
a motion for summary judgment partially by recognizing that the United States, “like the States in
their parens patriae capacities,” could pursue an action to recover for damages to wildlife on federal
land in Nebraska. In Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 865–66 (D. Colo. 1985), the federal
district court for the State of Colorado refused to extend the doctrine to impose duties in addition
to those set forth in the Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 1131 et seq.) to assert and to claim reserved
water rights for wilderness areas in Colorado. In People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo.
1979) the Colorado Supreme Court refused to impose a public trust theory to resolve the issue
of public stream access. In In Re Title, Ballot, Title, Submission Clause for 2011-2012 No. 3, 274
P.3d 562 (Colo. 2012) the Colorado Supreme Court allowed a ballot initiative that would adopt
the public trust doctrine for Colorado water law to go forward; the initiative later failed. However,
Justice Hobbs set forth a comprehensive dissent: dropping this “nuclear bomb on Colorado water
rights” violated the single subject requirement under the Colorado Constitution (Colo. Const. art.
5, § 1(5.5)) because the ballot initiative combined more than one subject—namely, the different
evolution of public water ownership and that of public submerged-land ownership regimes in
Colorado. Id. at 570–76.

See, e.g., Kansas Water Resources Board, Report on the Laws of Kansas Pertaining to
Beneficial Use of Water 91 (1956).
126
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it has figured prominently in the interstate management of the Platte River Basin,
especially in regulating surface diversions; but it has not played much of a role in
reducing groundwater pumping more closely connected to such streamflows.127
Sadly, many of the groundwater-dependent ecosystems of the Great Plains had
lost their critical flows before the ESA was in place to protect aquatic habitat.128
(Because streamflows continue to diminish, however, the ESA promises to remain
an important regulatory consequence.) Minimum streamflow requirements based
on state law can force the administration of junior groundwater rights during low
flow periods, but they typically lack the seniority to reduce depletions caused by
senior groundwater rights.129

C. Goals of a Potential Ogallala Adjudication
Like its general stream adjudication counterpart, a general stream/aquifer
adjudication over the Ogallala would need to resolve the problems which made
the proceeding necessary in the first place. There is good news and bad news in
this regard.
The good news is twofold. Large reserved water rights claims, whether by
tribes or the federal government, do not present the southern Great Plains states
with anything remotely like those facing the Rocky Mountain states, whose large
tribal claims properly dominate the general stream adjudication process. The same
is generally true for environmental claims on the water supply, whether imposed
by federal environmental law, or by instream flow rights and requirements.
The bad news concerns the problems of over-appropriation and permanent
depletion in a predominantly groundwater context. There is the problem of overappropriation in time, a serious, but legally innocent problem. There is also the
quantitatively greater, and far less innocent, problem of over-appropriation as a
matter of policy: by favoring present beneficial use over the long-term security of
a water right, this policy substantially weakened the priority system in practice,
and produced massive and permanent groundwater depletions. An adjudication
of predominantly Ogallala water supplies can correct the distortions in Ogallala
water rights that have resulted from that depletion, and it can define those rights
accurately; but to do either, it must confront depletion in the first place.
Like a general stream adjudication, a general stream/aquifer adjudication
can establish the proper boundaries between sovereigns at the interstate level,
127

See supra note 58 and accompanying text.

See supra note 16 and accompanying text. For groundwater-dependent ecosystems, see
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Beyond Connections: Pursuing Multidimensional Conjunctive Management,
47 Idaho L. Rev. 273 (2011).
128

See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 82a-703a, -703b, -703c (2015) (establishing minimum
desirable streamflows, but with a priority of 1984 or later).
129
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and can resolve competing jurisdictional claims to a common water supply at
the intrastate level. In order to accomplish such ends, however, the adjudication
must confront how these boundaries and claims have shifted in the wake of the
groundwater revolution. The first round of interstate litigation over groundwater
presented relatively clean and clear boundaries: lower basin states, harmed by
depletions to their water supplies allegedly (if rather obviously) caused by upper
basin states’ excessive groundwater pumping, sued the upper basin states for
violating interstate river compacts.130 The plaintiff states brought their suits on
behalf of all of their citizens and water users, regardless of whether they hold water
rights or not, and regardless of the source of water upon which those rights
depended.131 That is because states are sovereigns, and not merely agents or
trustees of those who own water rights.132 The fundamental issue in these
disputes was the relationship of groundwater and groundwater conditions to such
compacts; and the most important judicial and adjudicative task in these cases
lay in determining the extent of that relationship, by integrating groundwater
within the total water supply allocated by the river compact at issue.133
Yet beneath these deceptively clear legal and political interstate boundaries is
an increasingly important, complicated, and troublesome hydrological boundary:
that between surface water and groundwater, and the irrigators who depend
upon these different (and sometimes hydrologically connected) supplies.134 For

130
Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983) (interstate litigation concerning excessive
groundwater pumping in New Mexico’s portion of the Pecos River Basin, in violation of the
Pecos River Compact); Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995) (interstate litigation concerning
excessive groundwater pumping in Colorado’s portion of the Arkansas River Basin, in violation
of the Arkansas River Compact); Kansas v. Nebraska, 525 U.S. 1101 (1999) (interstate litigation
concerning excessive groundwater pumping in Nebraska’s portion of the Republican River Basin,
in violation of the Republican River Compact). For an excellent and entertaining history of the
first case, see G. Emlen Hall, High and Dry: The Texas-New Mexico Struggle for the Pecos
River (2002).
131
See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 509 (1932) (private owners of water rights
are represented by their state under the parens patriae doctrine and they are bound by any decree
that results).
132
Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2001) (citing New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S.
76 (1883); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923)).
133
See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, No. 126 Orig., First Report of the Special Master (Subject:
Nebraska’s Motion to Dismiss), (Jan. 28, 2000). In the wake of the Special Master’s finding
that the Republican River Compact required accounting for depletions caused by groundwater
pumping, the parties negotiated a settlement agreement and adopted a groundwater model that
formally incorporates groundwater into the Compact accounting. Kansas v. Colorado, No. 126
Orig., Final Settlement Stipulation (Dec. 15, 2002), approved by Decree of May 19, 2003, 538
U.S. 720 (2003).

This paragraph relies upon Griggs, Irrigation Communities, Political Cultures, and the Public
in the Age of Depletion, in Bridging the Distance: Common Issues in the Rural West 141–90
(David B. Danbom ed., 2015).
134
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example, Nebraska has chosen to comply with the Republican River Compact
by administering senior surface water rights, while allowing pumping from
junior groundwater wells to continue.135 From a political standpoint, this is a
rational policy choice in Nebraska, where groundwater pumping dwarfs surface
water diversions.136 It may even be a legal choice, given the doctrinal and
jurisdictional boundaries between surface water and groundwater that have long
existed within Nebraska.137 As a consequence of this policy choice, however,
conflicts have emerged between surface water and groundwater irrigation interests
within Nebraska, largely because the former shoulder a much greater (and, almost
certainly, an inequitably large) burden for complying with the compact.138 So
far, surface water irrigation interests have not obtained legal relief from this
state policy.139 Indeed, the intrastate conflict between some surface water and
groundwater interests in Nebraska has become so intractable that the former
testified in support of Kansas in its recent lawsuit to enforce the compact. They
did so because they realized that they would benefit under the Kansas remedy—
retiring 312,000 acres of land from groundwater irrigation—whereas they
suffered under Nebraska’s compliance approach of administering surface rights.140
This, too, is a rational policy choice. But the fact that the respective rational
policy choices of the State and its senior most water rights holders are opposed

135
These actions are taken pursuant to Integrated Management Plans, or IMPs. Neb.
Rev. Stat. §§ 46-714 to -718 (2014); see, e.g., Integrated Management Plan for the Upper
Republican Natural Resources District (Nov. 1, 2010), available at http://dnr.ne.gov/IWM/
NRD/UpperRep/URNRD_IMP_0910.pdf; State of Nebraska, Department of Natural Resources,
In the Matter of Water Administration of the Republican River Basin, Order [placing] Compact Call
Year in Effect (Jan. 1, 2014), available at http://www.dnr.nebraska.gov/iwm/order-for-republicanriver-compact-call-year (administering all surface water rights in the Republican River Basin).

As of 1990, groundwater pumping irrigated fourteen times more land than surface water
irrigation in Nebraska. Vincent H. Dreeszen, Water Availability and Use, in Robert D. Kuzelka et
al., Flat Water: A History of Nebraska and Its Water 84 (1993).
136

137

See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.

The Nebraska Ground Water Management Act requires equitable treatment for surface
and groundwater users when Nebraska administers water rights and well permits for the purpose
of compact compliance. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-703(2) (2014). The Nebraska Supreme Court has
similarly held that a balancing of equities is an appropriate rule for adjudicating a conflict between a
surface water user and a pumper of hydrologically connected groundwater. Spear T Ranch v. Knaub,
691 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. 2005). The Department of the Interior has become officially concerned
about Nebraska’s approach to compact compliance. Letter from Anne J. Castle, Assistant Secretary
for Water and Science, United States Department of Interior, to Brian P. Dunnigan, Director,
Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (Sept. 30, 2014) (on file with author).
138

139
Frenchman Cambridge Irrigation Dist. v. Nebraska Dept. of Natural Resources, 801
N.W.2d 253 (Neb. 2011).
140
Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado, No. 126 Orig., Pre-Filed Testimony of Kansas Witness
Brad Edgerton (Manager, Frenchman-Cambridge Irrigation District) at 5–22 (July 26, 2012); Id.,
Pre-Filed Testimony of Kansas Witness Marvin Swanda (Bureau of Reclamation); Id., Pre-Filed
Testimony of Kansas Witness Aaron Thompson (Area Manager, Bureau of Reclamation) (July 19,
2012), (all on file with author).
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to each other suggests that in some cases at least, hydrological boundaries—and
the refusal to coordinate water rights administration across them—have become
more determinative than political ones.

D. Consequences of a Potential Ogallala Adjudication
Given these distinctive problems—the hydrological problem of permanent
groundwater depletion and the various boundary problems between surface water
and groundwater—Great Plains water rights systems appear to have a pressing
need for what an adjudication could achieve. The situation is arguably worse
there. In many areas above the Ogallala, a hydrological balance between the local
water supply and its attendant water rights can be achieved within the prior
appropriation system, because there is sufficient groundwater baseflow to sustain
those rights, albeit at a reduced level.141 Yet across those areas where the Ogallala
is the sole or predominant source of supply, such a balance will be very difficult
to achieve, given the magnitude and the extent of its over-appropriation.142
In Kansas, the Chief Engineer, whose position claims jurisdiction over all
groundwater rights, could administer all junior rights; that appears to be his
statutory duty.143 In Nebraska, the Director of DNR, whose position is generally
impotent to regulate groundwater pumping, could ask that the Governor call a
committee to do so.144 These are legally available but unlikely remedies, because
they are unpractical and even impracticable from an administrative standpoint,
and unpopular and even suicidal from a political one. As if out of respect for the
formidability of these obstacles, states have developed administrative procedures
that make it more burdensome to reduce groundwater pumping in an Ogallala
situation than in an alluvial one.145
This distinction between groundwater systems which can be restored to
hydrological balance through administration, and those which practically

For the best example from Kansas, see In the Matter of the Designation of an Intensive
Groundwater Use Control Area in Barton, Rush, and Ness Counties, Kansas (Jan. 29, 1992),
available at http://www.ksda.ks.gov/docs/default-source/igucas/wc1992.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (Order of
the Chief Engineer, Kansas Division of Water Resources, allocating water in the Walnut Creek
Intensive Groundwater Use Area according to a cutoff priority date of Oct. 1, 1965); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 82a-1038(b)(2) (2015) (requiring the Chief Engineer, Division of Water Resources, to
follow priority dates of water rights “insofar as may be reasonably done”).
141

142
A prominent 1973 report estimated that pumping exceeded recharge nationally by a factor
of forty-six. National Water Commission, Water Policies for the Future 230 (1973). Across
much of western Kansas, the core irrigation regions above the Ogallala are pumping three to four
times more than the estimated long-term recharge value. J.A. Schloss, B.B. Wilson, and R.W.
Buddenmeier, Changes in Use Necessary for Sustainability (Kansas Geological Survey, 2000), http://
www.kgs.ku.edu/HighPlains/atlas/atsust.htm (last visited July 9, 2015).
143

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-706 (2015).

144

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-719 (2014).

145

See, e.g., Kan. Admin. Regs. § 5-4-1(a) (2010); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-719 (2014).
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cannot, is an important distinction, because it bears on the practical reality of the
property interest in groundwater itself. In a system which can be balanced, an
adjudication or other regulatory action would impose reductions in the authorized
quantities of all but the senior-most rights. In exchange, however, the rights so
reduced in quantity would receive, at least theoretically, some compensation in
quality, becoming more durable, enforceable, and marketable.146 In a groundwater
system that is too far out of balance, however, this exchange of quantity for quality
will not be generally available. The holders of junior rights in a non-renewable
groundwater system have almost nothing to gain by such an adjudication.
Because the hydrology and over-appropriation of such a system together create a
situation where juniors greatly outnumber seniors, it should come as little
surprise that the Ogallala states have not produced any adjudications since the
groundwater revolution.
In the shadows of this inaction, various specters haunt these water rights.
There is the practical lack of legal repose in the status of these rights across the
different legal regimes of the Great Plains states, despite what those regimes
have achieved elsewhere regarding groundwater management.147 There is the
threat of takings, which is always a politically powerful threat, regardless of
its legal validity.148 There are excessively complicated and procedurally painful
administrative procedures, which seek to square the circle of achieving effective
priority administration in a situation beset by basin-wide groundwater level
declines.149 And instead of markets in water rights, there is something like an
under-market, where the thing marketed is not a water right, but rather the
consent not to use or not to protect one.150
Reflecting upon the prospect of an Ogallala adjudication raises thorny
issues about the property rights so adjudicated. To appreciate these problems,
it helps to recall that water rights are shaped by at least three different forces.
First, constitutional provisions, statutes, and the common law together establish
the legal definition to the right, and set forth the legal boundaries of its exercise.

146

See supra note 85 and accompanying text.

147

For Kansas, see Peck, supra note 72.

John C. Peck, Property Rights in Groundwater—Some Lessons from the Kansas Experience,
12 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 493, 501–05, 509 (2003); Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 Wash.
U. L. Rev. 253, 253 (2013); Joseph Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water
Law, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 257, 260 n.5 (1990) (citing a letter from Professor MacDonnell which
described the commonly held belief in the heightened property rights status of water rights).
148

149
See, e.g., Kan. Admin. Regs. § 5-4-1a (2015). A senior right holder frustrated with this
procedure abandoned it, filed a civil suit against an impairing junior right, and has so far obtained
an injunction against the defendant’s pumping. See Garetson Brothers v. American Warrior, Inc.
(Haskell Co., Kansas), (No. 12-CV-9) (2012). The district court’s injunction was recently upheld
on appeal. See Garetson Brothers v. American Warrior, Inc., 347 P.3d 687 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015).
150

See Griggs, supra note 100, at 1298–1304.
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Second, the state water agency and state courts regulate the right, especially during
times of shortage or enhanced water management, according to conditions which
the state places upon it. These are conditions which determine what the state
can do to the right; they are distinct from what the holder can do with the right,
according to its legal definition and its attributes, such as authorized quantity, rate
of diversion, place of use, and type of use. Water rights in a prior appropriation
legal regime thus combine the elements of exclusion and governance.151 Yet
across the Ogallala especially, the holder of the right shapes it through a third
force, that of practice, which is not necessarily coincidental or harmonious with
the right’s legal definitions or its regulatory obligations, or with its positive and
negative liberties. To address these often cross-buffeting forces, state water codes
typically contain a few clear rules—priority, beneficial use, abandonment—that
are immersed in murky statutory and regulatory exceptions, exceptions often
produced by special-interest legislation or regulation.152 Largely because of the
political and administrative benefits of murkiness, an Ogallala adjudication has
not been seriously considered, much less done; the clarity which an adjudication
can provide is not something which most groundwater right holders find to be
desirable. In certain practical respects, the real condition of water rights across the
Ogallala may be as confused, misleading, and unsettled today as it was before the
development of modern water law codes seventy years ago.153
Instead, states across the Great Plains have devised various alternatives to
adjudications, employing management actions that do not threaten to permanently
reduce or modify the specific legal attributes of water rights. At the precatory level,
there are state water plans, which describe the supply gaps caused by increased
demand and declining supply, but which avoid legislative recommendations
to close them.154 Basic management actions can include: identifying certain
groundwater areas and basins to be managed in a more rigorous and restrictive
manner; imposing allocation limits (in states which follow the correlative rights
doctrine for groundwater) and metering and reporting requirements; and
establishing limits to protect existing rights from impairment by new rights,
such as well-spacing limits, depletion formulae, and closing areas to new wells.155

Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 Ariz. L.
Rev. 445, 458 (2008).
151

The classic articulation of this problem is by Carol A. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property
Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577 (1988).
152

153

See Griggs, supra note 100, at 1304–08.

Colorado Water Conservation Board, Colorado’s Water Plan 3–5, 343 (draft of
Dec. 10, 2014), available at www.coloradowaterplan.com; Kansas Water Office, Kansas Water
Plan 2014, available at http://www.kwo.org/Kansas_Water_Plan/KansasWaterPlan2014.html;
Kansas Water Office, Vision for the Future of Water Supply in Kansas 25–32 (Draft II, Nov.
2014), available at www.kwo.org.
154

The rules and regulations, as well as the management plans, of Kansas groundwater
management districts and Nebraska natural resources districts reflect this managerial approach.
155
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However laudatory their intent, many of these management actions have served
principally to protect the groundwater pumping of existing water rights holders
from interference by new users, rather than reducing overall water usage; as a
consequence, they have done little to stem the aquifer’s depletion.156 They have
not reconciled the doctrine of prior appropriation with the reality of depletion.
More aggressive management actions, including voluntary ones, can impose
reductions on permissible groundwater withdrawals, but it is unsettled whether
and how these reductions permanently change the water rights themselves.157 That
lack of clarity seems especially problematic under Kansas law, which provides
explicit definitions and specific attributes for groundwater rights under the prior
appropriation system.158 (Water codes elsewhere in the West require reductions in
total groundwater water use in a particular groundwater basin or area, but these
statutory regimes have carefully and explicitly avoided defining or redefining
the legal contours of the property right in water, largely because of the political
obstacles to such a definition, or because of the legal peculiarities of groundwater
rights in those states.)159 In any event, the most powerful management action tool
available in Kansas, the Intensive Groundwater Use Control Area (IGUCA), has
been used to restore sustainable systems, but it has yet to be deployed anywhere
across the Ogallala.160 A promising innovation in Kansas law, the Local Enhanced
Management Area (LEMA), provides for voluntary but legally binding reductions
in groundwater pumping; but it has yet to spread beyond one temporary program
in northwest Kansas.161

IV. Envisioning an Ogallala Stream/Aquifer Adjudication
Let us recapitulate the principal problems at hand, preferably with a strong
drink. First, there is the legal problem. Where the dominant source of water is
See, e.g., Kan. Admin. Regs. §§ 5-24-1 et seq. (2015), available at www.gmd4.org (for Northwest
Kansas Groundwater Management District No. 4 (Dec. 8, 2006), Northwest Kansas Groundwater
Management District No. 4, Revised Management Program (2012)); Integrated Management
Plan for the Upper Republican, supra note 135.
See Leland E. Rolfs, Comparing and Contrasting the Roles of the Division of Water Resources
and the Groundwater Management Districts in Groundwater Management and Regulation, 15 Kan.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 505 (2006); Michael K. Ramsey, Kansas Groundwater Management Districts: A
Lawyer’s Perspective, 15 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 517, 522 (2006).
156

157
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 82a-1038(b)(3), 82a-1041(f )(3) (2015) (enabling the Chief Engineer
to impose reductions in permissible groundwater withdrawals in an Intensive Groundwater Use
Control Area and a Local Enhanced Management Area respectively).
158

Id. § 82a-701(g).

See, e.g., California Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, Cal. Water Code
§ 10720 et seq., esp. § 10720.5 (West 2015); Groundwater Management Act of 1980, Ariz. Rev.
Stat. § 45-401 et seq. (2015) (Arizona).
159

160
See John C. Peck, Kansas Groundwater Management Districts, U. Kan. L. Rev. 51 (1980);
Peck, supra note 148.

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-1041 (2014) amended by 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 60; see Griggs,
supra note 100, at 1291–92; see also infra note 187.
161
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the non-renewable supply of the Ogallala, the typical groundwater right certifies
an impossible fiction: a legally permanent real property right that rests upon an
impermanent and rapidly declining water supply.162
Next, there are the administrative and regulatory problems: across their
different doctrinal and regulatory regimes, the chief water officials of Kansas
and Nebraska have not protected prior rights and the water supplies upon which
they depend. Faced with the facts of the aquifer’s depletion, the Chief Engineer
of Kansas DWR has very rarely administered junior groundwater rights to the
Ogallala, and he has not initiated any IGUCAs in the Ogallala-supplied areas.
The Director of Nebraska DNR has done the Kansas Chief Engineer one better,
by administering senior surface rights to protect junior groundwater pumpers.163
In Kansas, there is the decision not to apply or to enforce the priority doctrine.
In Nebraska, the doctrine is not protecting senior rights, and is effectively
operating backwards.
Fortunately, both officials enjoy that most precious resource amid a scandal—
plausible deniability. The Kansas Chief Engineer can claim that he has the
power, but not the explicit duty, to protect senior rights on his own initiative.164
Conversely, the director of the Nebraska DNR can claim that he has the duty (to
comply with interstate compact obligations) but lacks the power (to administer
groundwater permits), and so he must impose a “first in time, last in right” water
rights administration.165 Both chief officials thus depend, paradoxically, upon
impotence. Sadly, that claim is credible. In Kansas, the Chief Engineer must
answer to two politically superior forces: the Secretary of Agriculture, a political
appointee of the Governor, and to Kansas groundwater management districts
(GMDs), which make up in political power what they lack in regulatory power.166
For the most part, Kansas GMDs have not confronted the problem of the Ogallala’s
permanent depletion.167 They have not recommended reduced groundwater
pumping to extend the life of the Ogallala, and they have not petitioned the
Chief Engineer to initiate an IGUCA. On the contrary, the most powerful of
these GMDs, in Southwest Kansas, is advocating for a “Kansas Aqueduct,” which
would divert water from the Missouri River in northeast Kansas, and pump it
over 300 miles and up over 3,000 vertical feet to western Kansas, to maintain

162

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-701(g) (2015).

163

See supra note 135 and accompanying text.

164

Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 82a-706, 82a-1036 (2015).

165

See supra note 135 and accompanying text.

166
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 74-606b, 82a-1901, 82a-1020 (2015). Likewise, Kansas is the only
state that houses its water resources agency within a department of agriculture.

A hopeful but still unique exception is Northwest Kansas GMD No. 4, which initiated the
Sheridan-6 Local Enhanced Management Area. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
167
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current levels of water use at enormous and clearly infeasible expense.168 Nebraska
NRDs have achieved similar projects on a smaller scale. Rather than reducing
groundwater pumping to address depleted streamflows in the Republican River
Basin, NRD’s have constructed “augmentation” projects. These projects pump
deeper Ogallala groundwater and pipe it into various tributaries of that river,
where, by the alchemical forces of Nebraska water law, it becomes surface water,
deliverable to Kansas under the Republican River Compact, but unavailable to
surface irrigators in Nebraska.169 As a whole, groundwater interests across the
Kansas and Nebraska portions of the Ogallala have mostly avoided reductions to
their groundwater pumping, even as that avoidance has undercut the long-term
viability of their irrigation enterprises.
Finally, there is a property problem. Holders of senior rights, unprotected
by their own chief water officials and their local districts, have been left to their
rights. In Kansas however, holders of senior groundwater rights have almost
entirely avoided filing impairment claims to shut down junior rights. Between
2006 and 2008, only sixteen such claims were filed statewide—across a universe
of approximately 40,000 wells—and most of these claims were brought outside
Ogallala areas.170 Nor have they petitioned the Chief Engineer to initiate
proceedings for an IGUCA as is their right.171 Having mostly avoided these
regulatory options, they have also refrained from suing the junior water rights
holders who are impairing their rights.172 In Nebraska, holders of senior surface
rights have joined together to sue DNR and the State, to stop the policy of shutting
off their rights in favor of groundwater pumping, but they have so far been denied
relief.173 On behalf of irrigators who depend upon Bureau of Reclamation surface
water rights in Nebraska, the United States has officially warned the Director of
DNR; but no litigation has yet to ensue.174
Defective legal description, intentional regulatory inaction, and the failure
to protect senior water rights: these describe all too well many of the operative
water rights-related situations in Kansas and Nebraska, whose lands and irrigators

168
Kansas Water Office and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Update of 1982 Six State
High Plains Aquifer Study Alternate Route B, esp. ch. 4, 4-29 (2015), available at http://www.
kwo.org/projects_programs/Aqueduct/Rpt_Aqueduct_Study_Update_012715_kf.pdf.

See, e.g., Upper Republican Natural Resources District, Nebraska Project Poised to Aid Interstate
Water Compact, Protect Producers, Irrigation Leader, Mar. 1, 2011, at 16–17.
169

170

Griggs, supra note 100, at 1299 n.212.

171

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-1036 (2015).

172

See supra note 149 and accompanying text.

173
See Hill v. Nebraska, (Case No. CI 14-68, Furnas County, Nebraska. 2014--), Order
Sustaining Defendant’s Rule 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Mar. 24, 2015); Frenchman Cambridge
Irrigation Dist. v. Nebraska Dept. of Natural Resources, 801 N.W.2d 253 (Neb. 2011).
174

See Letter of Anne J. Castle, supra note 138.
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together lie above three-quarters of the water stored in the Ogallala Aquifer.175
General stream adjudications can provoke literary references to Bleak House, the
novel by Charles Dickens.176 But these situations—first in time, last in right;
administration by avoidance; augmentation through subtraction—evoke Lewis
Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.
Fixing this topsy-turvy situation requires a candid confrontation with its root
causes. A regulatory and enforcement paralysis has beset the over-appropriated
groundwater systems of the Great Plains. Legal and regulatory confusions pervade
the region and its multiple water boundaries: the hydrological, doctrinal, and
jurisdictional boundaries between surface water and groundwater; the boundaries
between alluvial or tributary groundwater and fossil or non-tributary groundwater;
and the increasingly tense boundaries between state authority and local control.
Properly structured, a general stream/aquifer adjudication would confront this
paralysis, and resolve these confusions. To that end, the remainder of this article
describes, in fairly general terms, how such an admittedly idealized adjudication
could do so.177

A. The Authorized Forum and its General Procedure
A Great Plains general stream/aquifer adjudication would begin with
enabling legislation authorizing the adjudicatory process as simply and as flexibly
as possible. The legislation would establish a specialized, state water rights court,
part of the greater state court system. A chief water judge would preside over
this court, and, if necessary, employ subordinate judges or water masters, similar
to the model established in the Montana water court system.178 Because of the
near-total absence of significant federal reserved water rights claims across the
Ogallala region, the potential for disputes over the proper forum should be low.
State agencies and districts with regulatory or supervisory authority over water
rights and water management should be necessary parties. In Kansas, they would

U.S. Geological Survey, High Plains Aquifer Water-Level Monitoring Study Characteristics
of the High Plains Aquifer, http://ne.water.usgs.gov/ogw/hpwlms/hpchar.html (last visited July 9,
2015); McGuire, V.L., Water-level and Storage Changes in the High Plains Aquifer, Predevelopment
to 2011 and 2009–11, at 15 (U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2012–5291,
2013), http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2012/5291/ (last visited July 9, 2015) (quantifying Nebraska’s share
of the Ogallala at 68.3 percent and Kansas’s at 9 percent).
175

Thorson et al., 2006, supra note 3, at 302 (comparing Arizona’s Little Colorado River
Adjudication to Jarndyce and Jarndyce, the never-ending lawsuit in Bleak House).
176

The following discussion essentially adopts by reference the recommendations contained
in Thorson, et al., 2006, supra note 3, at 473– 81 (setting up successful procedural structures to
employ in general stream adjudications).
177

Mont. Code Ann. §§ 3-7-201, -301 (2015); Montana Water Right Adjudication
Rules 1, 1(b), 3.
178
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be DWR, the Kansas Water Office (where applicable), and the relevant GMD.179
In Nebraska, they would be DNR and the relevant NRD. The legislation would
also require the full participation of state geological surveys and other agencies,
whose pre-existing water-related data and analyses would provide a large part
of the technical record to which the parties might stipulate, and, depending
upon the situation, support a rebuttable presumption of validity. Ideally, federal
agencies such as the United States Geological Survey, the National Resources
Conservation Service, and the Bureau of Reclamation would participate and
contribute in a similar fashion. The enabling legislation should also identify, in
some priority order of need, the regions and groundwater basins that most require
adjudication, thus relieving the state water rights court of making such a
potentially politicized decision.180 To expedite final judicial review, decisions of
the court would be appealable directly to the state supreme court, as water court
decisions are in Colorado and Montana.181

B. Quantification, Negotiation, and Regulatory Correction
Once established, the state water court would begin its work. The threshold
task would be quantitative, to establish the water budget for the subject basin,
which would almost always be dominated by groundwater. Measuring the
demand side should be a fairly straightforward process, and that process should
yield reasonably accurate numbers. First, the relevant state agency (in Kansas,
DWR; in Nebraska, the relevant NRD and DNR, acting together) would sum
all of the authorized quantities of all water rights and well permits in the relevant
basin. That sum would provide the gross, and mostly static, figure for all of the
“paper water” in the basin. Next, the same agencies would compute the gross
actual water usage in the basin, based on the water use reports of the water rights
holders themselves. In Kansas, the holders of all water rights except domestic
rights have been required to submit annual water use reports since 1988, and
the reporting rate exceeds ninety-nine percent.182 Similar requirements exist
for surface water rights in Nebraska, and metering requirements and pumping
The Kansas Water Office serves as the intermediary between federal reservoir supplies and
state water users, and supervises the state water plan. Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 74-2608 et seq., 82a-1301
et seq. (State Water Plan Storage Act), 82a-901 et seq. (State Water Resource Planning Act) (2015).
For GMDs, see id., § 82a-1020 et seq.
179

180

See, e.g., Cal. Water Code § 10720.7 (West 2015).

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-102(1)(d) (2015); Montana Water Right Adjudication
Rule 25.
181

182
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-732 (2015); John C. Peck and Burke W. Griggs, Groundwater Law
and Management: The Asia (IWMI)-Kansas Program, 41 Creighton L. Rev. 315, 332 (2008). DWR
performs spot-checks in the field to evaluate the accuracy of water use reports and to test metering
systems; while no regulatory system can eliminate the fraudulent reports and meter-tampering,
strong civil penalties and water use penalties for these violations can be an effective remedy. In
representing DWR, the author can testify to how scofflaw irrigators in both Kansas and Nebraska
have developed impressively creative means of under-reporting their water use.
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records have quantified groundwater use in some Nebraska NRD’s since 1978.183
The sum of actual water usage in the subject basin, based on the reports and
meters of the holders themselves, yields the figure for all of the “wet water” in
the basin—or at least a presumptive one, subject to rebuttal where such records
and metering may be incorrect or even fraudulent. This “wet water” figure is an
altogether more useful figure than that for “paper water”—for the former reveals
the quantities actually diverted, pumped, and relied upon over the past three
decades, as the aquifer has tilted into its decline phase.184 In areas where the Ogallala
Aquifer is thickest, as in much of Nebraska and in parts of Southwest Kansas,
this historical record of water usage will vary mostly according to precipitation:
pumping will decrease in wet years and increase in droughts. Elsewhere, where
the aquifer is thin and supplies less robust, the use records will likely show a
steady decline in pumping. Most of the areas that would be likely subjects of an
Ogallala adjudication are either officially or effectively closed to new water rights.
Moreover, the modern water codes of Nebraska and Kansas have long provided
for the recognition or extinguishment of water rights claims that existed outside
their respective administrative systems.185 As a result, these sums and historical
records should provide a sufficiently comprehensive quantification of current
water demand in the subject basin. (Domestic water rights across the Great Plains
are both small and usually exempt from permitting and reporting requirements;
the legislation enabling the adjudication should thus probably exempt them from
the adjudication.)
On the other hand, measuring the total water supply for an Ogallala adju
dication is a less straightforward task than it first appears. In alluvial groundwater
and surface water systems such as that of the Republican River or Arkansas River
Basins, comprehensive pumping data and stipulated groundwater models can
provide accurate and dependable quantifications of the annual, but variable,
water supply, as well as the effects of groundwater pumping upon stream
flows.186 Across much of the Ogallala, however, the water supply is largely
non-renewable, non-perpetual, and non-variable on an annual basis. These
hydrological and temporal qualities do not correspond well with the assumptions
of the typical prior appropriation right, whose authorized quantity is typically
granted on an annual basis, and whose priority largely determines how much of
that quantity can be used in a drought year, when supplies run short. So, while
the total saturated thickness of the subject aquifer area, its total (and essentially
captive) water supply, and annual changes in these totals can all be accurately
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See e.g., Integrated Management Plan for the Upper Republican, supra note 135, at 2.

For a graphic illustration of this difference, see the online maps from Changes in Use
Necessary for Sustainability, supra note 142 (maps showing the percent reduction in authorized use
needed versus percent reduction in reported use needed).
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Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 46-226 et seq. (2014); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 82a-704a to -704c (2015).
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See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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measured, these figures serve only as a starting point for an Ogallala-specific
adjudication. They must be translated and reduced to utility, by employing
assumptions about the operation of the groundwater rights: their pumping
amounts (on an annual basis, based on the present or the recent past), their
pumping rates, the irrigation efficiencies of their delivery works, and so on.
Applied to these totals, they yield the number that water users and analysts most
want to know: the estimated usable remaining life of the aquifer, based on current
levels of over-appropriation. The Kansas Geological Survey has performed this
type of hydrological analysis and groundwater modeling, which have served as
the basis for state regulatory action, local regulation, and water planning.187 An
adjudication could similarly leverage such data, analyses, and modeling, and the
enabling legislation for the adjudication should clearly enable the water court to
require it as a matter of course.188
The task of quantifying the subject water supply and comparing it with the
total water rights demand for the adjudication should not be too contentious. The
difference between these two totals—over-appropriation based on current rights
and usage—should be clear, and probably staggering.189 As described above, the
typical responses and established response mechanisms for closing this gap between
paper water and wet water have not done so. Straight priority administration of
water rights would certainly close the gap, but such a hyper-rational approach
is neither likely nor realistic; conversely, avoidance of administration and
enforcement mechanisms has been the customary rule, but that custom has only
widened the gap further over time.190 Once the water court has established this
number, it should remain subject to revision by retained jurisdiction, as in the
Colorado water court system.191
Having quantified and defined the over-appropriation gap, the water rights
court, in tandem with the parties to the adjudication, would then have to address
it. But the court should not force the issue. At this point in the process, the
adjudication should provide a substantial time period for the state water agencies,
groundwater districts, and water rights holders themselves to conduct negotiations
to accomplish whatever accord they can in resolving the over-appropriation

Kansas Department of Agriculture, Division of Water Resources, Order of Desig
Approving the Sheridan 6 Local Enhanced Management Area Within Groundwater
Management District No. 4, at 12–13 (Apr. 17, 2013), available at http://dwr.kda.ks.gov/
LEMAs/SD6/LEMA.SD6.OrderOfDesignation.20130417.pdf.
187

nation

In Kansas, courts resolving disputes between water rights owners can require the
Chief Engineer to serve as a factfinder, and to submit a report accordingly. Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 82a-725 (2015).
188

189

See supra note 142 and accompanying text.

190

See Griggs, supra note 100, at 1305–08.

See Michelle Bryan, At the End of the Day: Are the West’s General Stream Adjudications
Relevant to Modern Water Rights Administration?, 15 Wyo. L. Rev. 461, 475 (2015).
191
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gap. Montana’s rules for settlement conferences and mediation provide a good
procedural template for such an Ogallala adjudication.192
Substantively, two analogies for negotiation and settlement beckon. The first
is that of “water bankruptcy,” which Christine Klein has recently described.193
The demands upon the hydrological system vastly exceed what the water supply
can possibly provide. Both the regulators and the regulated are responsible for
these water debts: the state has granted far too many rights, creating the overappropriation gap, an overall water debt which is collectively “owned” by all of
the water rights holders who have depleted the aquifer’s supply in the subject
basin. In both bankruptcy law and western water law, the priority doctrine
establishes a clear procedure for paying debts and making sacrifices; but when
that procedure has become unworkable because of lack of resources, a reallocation
of assets and debts becomes imperative. Such a reallocation usually follows
some middle path—in the water rights context, a compromise between senior
and junior water rights—established most productively by negotiation. Such a
reallocation, however, may well produce substantial litigation as a consequence,
especially where the negotiations collectively compromise the priority doctrine.
Just as debtors and creditors can sue to block bankruptcy settlements, both senior
and junior water rights holders could do the same to a water rights settlement that
reduces (and even eliminates) the hydrological debt of over-appropriation.
The second analogy is that of federal reserved water rights, a useful, if rough
and negative one. As with federal reserved rights, the over-appropriation gap is
the most important number in the adjudication. Like a reserved water rights
award, it establishes the largest allocation of water in the adjudication— a massive
and permanent number, establishing the amount of water that holders of state
water law rights have been able to use in the past, but now cannot use.194 Unlike
a reserved right, however, that number does not merely represent water that is
now off-limits; it represents water that is gone, an allocation to the past. Like
state agencies and holders of state water rights negotiating with tribes and the
United States over a federal reserved right, they can, however, find some mutually
acceptable responses to the gap (which is a state law water supply shortage),
by negotiation, compromise, conveyance, and contract. As with reserved water
rights settlements, the most popular and politically acceptable negotiated
response would be financial. The State, in partnership with the federal treasury,

192

Mont. Code Ann. § 85-5-110 (2015); Montana Water Right Adjudication Rules

16–17.
193

Klein, supra note 22, at 560–624.

The Big Horn Adjudication quantified the tribes’ reserved right award at approximately
500,000 acre-feet per year. In re the General Adjudication Of All Rights To Use Water In The
Big Horn River System (Big Horn I), 753 P.2d 76, 103, 106–07 (Wyo. 1988) (awarding the
Tribes 209,732 acre-feet under the PIA standard and 290,490 acre-feet for lands which had been
historically irrigated).
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could substantially increase its retirement of irrigated land through programs such
as CREP and EQIP.195 Federal enthusiasm for such a remedy might be low, and
justifiably so. For compared to a typical reserved water rights settlement, which
uses federal dollars to ensure the security and to enable the exercise of a federal and
tribal water right, a federal buy-out of state law water rights would serve a purpose
analogous to that of the federal Troubled Asset Relief Program in securities.196 Yet
to the extent that targeted reductions in irrigated acreage could reduce the risk of
listings under the ESA, or protect and restore habitat necessary for species already
listed, the Ogallala states would probably serve as willing partners.197
In any case, the negotiation phase of a stream/aquifer adjudication will be
critical. Junior rights holders and holders of crippled wells could sell out to seniors
and to those with better supplies, presumably at a discount; likewise, juniors
could buy out seniors, probably at some premium. Holders of water rights whose
supply is least secure would eagerly seek state and federal retirement offers. Because
of the potential regulatory costs and burdens of the ESA, and because of the value
of threatened and endangered species themselves, those with water rights whose
retirement or reduction could benefit such species and ecosystems could command
higher prices from the federal government and from conservation groups. For the
same reason, owners of irrigated land might be willing to retire some or all of
their water rights, perhaps even at a discount, if retirement could help them avoid
the consequences of an ESA listing. As advocates of water markets point out, the
varieties of what can be negotiated are extensive.198 Voluntary negotiation could
potentially produce a significant reduction in total water rights demand. Given
their own substantial technical and financial resources, groundwater districts could
assist these negotiations. The water court would review negotiated transfers of
water rights as part of the adjudication, in tandem with the state water agency.199
Voluntary negotiation can only go so far, especially with a largely non-renewable
water supply such as a typical Ogallala sub-basin. To close the over-appropriation
gap further, legislation concurrent with the adjudication should require the state
water agency to propose rules which set significantly lower levels of maximum
necessary irrigation for the basins that will be adjudicated. This reduced maximum
could then be subject to general challenges through administrative hearings, and
by particular, site-specific challenges through the adjudication process. In either
case, the water agency and the water court judge would determine the general and
195

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of Oct. 3, 2008, Pub L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 31 U.S.C.). For a summary of Troubled Asset Relief
Program implementation, see Erik D. Klingenberg, Summary and Analysis of the Troubled Asset Relief
Program, 62 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 26 (2008).
196
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See supra notes 127, 128 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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E.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-708b (2015).
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specific standards, subject to appeal. (Ideally, these determinations would be made
early, so that water rights holders who engage in negotiation with one another will
be able to account for them.) Advancements in crop science, farming practices,
and irrigation technology have enabled irrigators to produce much higher yields
with the same water supply; but because current levels of irrigation are obviously
unsustainable and therefore hostile to the permanence of a real property water
right, it seems difficult to defend those levels on reasonableness grounds. It is
an uncontroversial tenet of western water law that the holder of a water right
cannot obtain a protectable property interest in the unreasonable use of water.
While the determination of such reasonableness is case-specific, it depends on
statewide considerations, most importantly the “ever increasing need for the
conservation of water . . . .”200 Irrigators in Kansas have already demonstrated that
they can exploit advancements in agriculture to produce lower but still profitable
yields with significantly less water.201 For the same reasons, concurrent legislation
should require a more stringent definition of water waste. For determinations
of both reasonableness and waste, the legislature as well as the water agency will
need to make certain policy decisions about permissible withdrawal levels. In
sub-basins whose annual recharge is very low, these decisions may contemplate
the gradual exhaustion of the local aquifer supply, or they may set a hard limit on
its depletion.202 The phased-in reductions of water usage established in the 1980
Arizona Groundwater Management Act provide a useful template for addressing
issues of reasonable use and waste within a depleting groundwater system.203
Assuming that legislation and the adjudication together achieved such
redefinitions of reasonableness and waste, it is a virtual certainty that irrigators
would challenge them. They would do so both facially and as applied to their
particular water rights, as reductions in the authorized quantity of their water
usage that constitute uncompensated takings of property. Politically, this would
be a strong argument: a reduction in wet water applied to the farm strikes many
as a physical taking, and legislators listen to irrigators and other stakeholders, not
law professors.204 Yet such a reduction should properly fall under the category of
regulatory takings jurisprudence. A water right is a use right, and water yet unused
belongs to the people of the state, subject to state regulation.205 Consequently, if the
200
City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 864 (Cal. 2000); accord, Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 82a-707(e) (2015) (forbidding appropriations in excess of the needs of the appropriator).
201
The irrigators in the Sheridan-6 LEMA voluntarily agreed to reduce their water use by
twenty percent over a five-year period. See Order of Designation, supra note 187, at 22–23.
202

See infra notes 211–16 and accompanying text.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 45-563 to 45-568 (2015) (establishing five successively more stringent
five-year periods of water management, including definitions of water duty, in Active Management Areas).
203
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See Sax, supra note 148.

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-701(g) (2015); State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp, 207 P.2d 440, 447
(Kan. 1949).
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state were to reduce that maximum to a level still enabling productive irrigation,
such a reduction, properly established and implemented, should withstand a
regulatory takings challenge.206 This seems especially true within the context of
the non-renewable supplies of the Ogallala, where reductions would extend the
useable lifetime of the water supply further into the future. If water becomes more
valuable as it becomes scarcer, the higher value of that future water use should
compensate, and even over-compensate, for reductions in present levels of use.
By the end of this quantification and reallocation stage, the water court
and the parties to the adjudication will have accomplished several important
things. They will have established the initial over-appropriation gap. With
security afforded by affirmative legislation, they will have determined reduced,
yet reasonable, maximum levels of irrigation and a more stringent definition of
waste. The holders of water rights in the subject basin will have negotiated private
reallocations among themselves, and they will have negotiated both partial and
total retirements of their rights with third parties, whether private conservation
groups or governmental agencies. All of these accomplishments will probably be
challenged at the administrative and judicial levels; but if the enabling legislation
for the adjudication is sufficiently strong and clear, this stage of the process should
survive judicial review mostly intact.207 On its own, this stage can significantly
reduce the over-appropriation gap.

C. Boundaries and Definitions
The quantification and reallocation stage of the adjudication is a necessary
stage, but it is not sufficient on its own. Even the most capable parties, experts,
judges, and lawyers, the most committed negotiators, the soundest water use
regulations, and the most generous buy-outs can only go so far against their
common opponent in a non-renewable groundwater system: nothingness itself, in
the form of permanent groundwater depletions. Unlike creditors in a bankruptcy
proceeding or tribes in a reserved water rights negotiation, permanent depletion
is not willing to negotiate. Despite the best efforts to reform and ameliorate
the governing regimes for Ogallala groundwater, the subject basin will almost
certainly remain substantially over-appropriated.
Beyond that point, the dominant issues revolve around time, and how
to make sense of it in property law. Geologically, all hydrological systems are
connected, and so no aquifers are completely cut off from surface water systems;
the migration of groundwater from distant uplands or deep aquifers to streams
and to rivers is only a matter of time—geological time. Yet in less than two
206

Peck, supra note 148, at 501–03; Owen, supra note 148, passim.

See, e.g., Knapp, 207 P.2d at 447; Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578 (Kan. 1962);
F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164 (Kan. 1981) (upholding the Kansas Water
Appropriation Act as constitutional under the police power of the State to regulate water use).
207

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2015

43

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 15 [2015], No. 2, Art. 6

456	Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 15

generations, Ogallala irrigators have depleted many of these systems past their
breaking point, depleting baseflows beneath where they can replenish stream and
river systems.208 Caught between these two mutually antagonistic calendars is the
law. Western water law generally presumes that the water rights that depend upon
these hydrological systems are permanent. That presumption has stubbornly
survived even as depletion has belied it, and so its survival has been marked by
ever-increasing contortions to straddle the distance between legalistic notions of
permanence and geologic facts of depletion.
Any Ogallala adjudication must be part of a larger deliberative process of
ending these distortions and adapting the governing water law to the realities
of permanent depletion. That adaptation will largely consist of recognizing
boundaries, a process which will require a water management compromise among
hydrology, current levels of groundwater pumping, and reliance upon existing
rights and law. What is the boundary between tributary/alluvial groundwater
and non-tributary, non-alluvial groundwater? In Colorado, the answer to that
question began as both a constitutional and a hydrological one, but needed history,
litigation, and legal reliance to answer.209 What are the boundaries of the water
supply of a river basin? In the Republican River Basin, the answer to that question
began with an interstate compact, but needed history, hydrology, a negotiated
groundwater model, a common understanding of the impacts of irrigation,
and two interstate lawsuits to articulate.210 Other boundaries require more
subjective but no less defensible determinations. What is the boundary between
sustainable and unsustainable groundwater supplies, and between permanent
and impermanent ones? What are the respective rights and responsibilities
for these different categories of supply? Answers to these questions require a
correlative determination of what is economically feasible for the irrigators who
rely upon the water supplies, as well as what the public, what aquatic habitats,
and what groundwater-dependent ecosystems can tolerate in terms of depletion.
In one way or another, all of these boundaries involve fundamental boundaries
between private property rights in the use of water and public ownership of the
state’s unused water supplies, as well as the public interest in how water is used
and conserved.
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See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-101 et seq. (2015) (designated groundwater); see supra note 103
and accompanying text; see also Griggs, supra note 100, at 1286–88.
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Republican River Compact, 57 Stat. 86 (May 26, 1943); Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado,
No. 126 Orig., First Report of the Special Master (Subject: Nebraska’s Motion to Dismiss),
(Jan. 28, 2000), approved in Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado, 530 U.S. 1272 (2000); Kansas v.
Nebraska & Colorado, No. 126 Orig., Final Settlement Stipulation (Dec. 15, 2002), approved
in 538 U.S. 720 (May 19, 2003); Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado, No. 126 Orig., Final Report
of the Special Master with Certificate of Adoption of RRCA Groundwater Model (Sept.
17, 2003), 540 U.S. 964 (2003) (Report and Certificate received and ordered filed); Kansas v.
Nebraska, No. 126 Orig., 547 U.S. ___ (slip opinion) (Feb. 24, 2015).
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It is well past time to address these boundaries explicitly in the law. Kansas
and Nebraska present fundamentally different boundary issues, because of the
differences between their respective water supplies, and because of the differences
between their respective water law regimes.
In Kansas, the most pressing problem is that of rapid and permanent
groundwater depletion across its portion of the Ogallala. Yet the formal virtues
and powers of the Kansas Water Appropriation Act—its centralized jurisdiction
over both surface and groundwater, and its regulation of both waters according to
the prior appropriation doctrine—have not really been exercised there. Holders
of water rights fear the regulatory uncertainties of such an exercise, largely because
the doctrine does not mesh well with non-renewable water supplies. Consequently,
the idea of administering water rights according to the Act’s provisions does not
enjoy legitimacy among the holders of water rights that the Act is largely intended
to protect.211
To remedy this problem of legitimacy, the stream/aquifer adjudication and
its enabling legislation require a third and interdependent component—statutory
power, granted to the water court, to classify adjudicated rights into one of
two classes. The first class of right would be that of the current (and presently
formalistic) Kansas water right; but this right would rest upon a permanence that
is legally definite, fully protectable, and hydrologically justified. During water
shortages, this right would receive prompt priority protection under existing
law, without the delay of administrative investigation; the adjudication will have
removed this regulatory disincentive.212 This right would also retain the status of a
real property right.213 Granting this classifying power to the water court will place
the burden on the water rights holder to establish two things: the quantitative
(and backward-looking) aspects of his or her historic water use, as in a traditional
adjudication; but also the right’s qualitative (and forward-looking) aspects. Most
important to this latter aspect would be the subject right’s ability to endure well
into the future, based on the hydrological realities undergirding its water supply,
and the legal reality of its priority date. Because the quality of a groundwater
right depends upon both of these characteristics, true temporal priority works
both ways. Where the adjudication finds that a water right whose usage, supply,
and priority together doom it to relative impermanence, then such a right cannot
legitimately claim to retain its status as a permanent and protectable right. Such a
right should therefore be demoted. The record would require it.
Demoted to what? To a second class of water right or permit, which would
receive status and protections commensurate with its relative impermanence, as
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Griggs, supra note 100, at 1308–12.

212

See, e.g., Kan. Admin. Regs. § 5-4-1a (2015).
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Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-701(g) (2015).
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determined through the adjudication. Such rights could potentially be recognized
as a new type of water permit, one similar to the well permits in the designated
basins of Eastern Colorado, which receive a lower level of protection than
tributary groundwater rights.214 Lower down the status scale, Kansas water law
already offers a pre-existing template for such a second-class right: a term permit,
an appropriative right which enjoys priority protection, but is valid for a limited
amount of time, and does not qualify as a permanent, real property right.215 In
any case, the State, DWR, and the water court would face the hard political and
institutional issue of whether to set a limit on the depletion of the subject water
supply, and at what level.216 Given the difficulty of such an issue, the temporary
nature of a term permit offers certain advantages. It can be renewed or extended at
a lower authorized quantity of withdrawal, and it expires on its own terms, rather
than by a water court decision or agency action.
Nebraska faces a different boundary challenge. The state enjoys bountiful
Ogallala supplies, far more than any other state; but its water code suffers from the
practical inability to administer water rights fairly across the surface/groundwater
divide during dry periods. Nebraska law requires the equitable treatment of these
distinct and structurally opposed property interests.217 But these interests answer
to different masters and distinct doctrines; and because groundwater irrigators
vastly outnumber surface water irrigators in Nebraska, state water policy tends
to favor groundwater pumping over surface diversions during times of shortage,
and surface water irrigators have yet to obtain the protections which Nebraska
law claims to afford them under the priority doctrine.218 As a result, there is
considerable unease, and potential litigation, concerning Nebraska’s failure to
protect surface water rights.219 A general stream/aquifer adjudication in basins that
have become chronically water-short, such as those in the Republican River Basin,
could decree a detailed administration plan across the spectrum of Nebraska water
rights: surface water rights, alluvial groundwater rights, upland and bench-land
groundwater rights more distant from the stream, and deep Ogallala rights which
are mostly unconnected from the surface system. Given Nebraska’s constitutional
assertion of the prior appropriation doctrine, such a decree should honor the
priority dates for the relevant surface rights.220 Regarding the various groundwater
rights, the decree could establish an equitable, and correlative, approach to
administration in dry periods, which recognizes that from an administration
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Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-102(1) (2015); see supra note 117 and accompanying text.

215

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-708c (2014) amended by 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 60.

Kansas attempted such a “two-pool” regulatory approach, which failed due to opposition
from western Kansas irrigators. Peck, supra note 148, at 505–06.
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standpoint, not all groundwater rights are created equal. Such an adjudication
could complement the integrated management plans of the NRDs, but it would
probably require their revision, because they currently lack equitable protections
for surface waters and surface rights.221
While legislation should formally recognize the existence of these boundaries,
it should leave to the water court the task of locating them, applying them, and
determining their legal porosity within the subject basin, as part of the adjudication
process. Establishing and protecting this judicial duty will enable water rights
holders, agencies, and the public to present evidence and testimony that supports
their respective positions, on a site- and case-specific basis that recognizes the
hydrological variability of the Ogallala formation, and will enable the court
to provide specific and equitable determinations. That duty seems especially
important regarding environmental and habitat issues, given the variety of Great
Plains ecosystems and the continued importance of the ESA. Ideally, the stream/
aquifer adjudication would comprise an integrated whole, with interdependent
elements: the legislation enabling the adjudication; concurrent legislation
redefining reasonable use, waste, and property rights; and the adjudication process
itself. In both states, such an adjudication could achieve what adjudications
are supposed to achieve: better clarity and definition in water rights, so those
rights can be protected in times of shortage, and subjected to more effective water
supply management.

V. Conclusion: Adjudication and the Future
of Water Management Across the Great Plains
The Big Horn and Snake River Basin general stream adjudications faced
numerous and difficult challenges. Ultimately, those challenges revolved around
a large but mostly monolithic problem: adjusting the respective quantities of
water diverted and used under all of the water rights in a subject basin, and
adjusting the administration regimes for regulating those rights, both within the
prior appropriation system. These adjustments became necessary to meet a water
budget broken by the force of federal reserved rights and environmental law.
Repairing that budget required laborious legal work, hydrological analysis, intense
negotiation, repeated litigation, and federally financed storage and irrigation
infrastructure. For all of the difficulties that have attended these adjudications,
fights about the prior appropriation doctrine have not really been among them.222

Integrated Management Plan for the Upper Republican, supra note 135. This is the
allegation put forth by the Department of Interior. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
221

This is a generalization, of course, and the exceptions are significant. For example, Arizona
spent decades litigating the legal issue of “subflow” in the Gila River and Little Colorado River
adjudications, an issue peculiar to Arizona. Weldon, supra note 5; Feller, supra note 4, at 423–25.
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By contrast, the possibility of a stream/aquifer adjudication across the Ogallala
portions of Kansas and Nebraska presents more fundamental challenges to their
respective water law regimes, and will require candid and ambitious changes to them.
But that should not be a disincentive. As described in this article, basic elements
of these regimes are not functional, as both regulators and holders of water rights
avoid and are refused the remedies which prior appropriation supposedly confers.
Both states have developed elaborate technical and administrative mechanisms
to cope with this avoidance, but these mechanisms have their limits, and we are
probably past them. An adjudication, supported in its pivotal stages by supportive
and declarative legislation, can bring much needed clarity and definition to these
Great Plains water rights, especially when supplies run short—because, after all,
you can’t administer what you can’t define.
More importantly, an adjudication can force needed changes at the most
fundamental level of water management, by motivating all parties to reconsider
property rights in water in the harsh light of permanent groundwater depletion.
Across the Ogallala region, the technical, legal, and administrative tools are
available to bring such an adjudicative effort to a comparatively efficient resolution;
what has been lacking is resolve.
An adjudication would help create that resolve. It would force the state to
articulate what its water rights actually confer. It would enable its water rights
holders to explain and to defend what rights they are fighting for. And it would
do both within a judicial forum that is as independent from the water politics
of the Ogallala as possible. The ultimate question, of course, is whether there is
sufficient courage and political will to embark upon an adjudication in the first
place. Abraham Lincoln complained to himself about his top general in 1862,
“if McLellan is not using the Army I should like to borrow it for awhile.”223
Had he done so, the Civil War would have ended sooner. Likewise, the Great
Plains states can no longer afford to play the role of a General McLellan, devoting
their collective and credentialed expertise to admiring the problem of depletion
and parading it about. They need to confront that problem instead, and an
adjudication would put that expertise to work.

President Abraham Lincoln to General McLellan, April 9, 1862 (unsent), in The Complete
Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. John G. Nicolay and John Hay, VII, at 141 (New York, 1908).
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